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Private Actors and Public Governance
Beyond the State: The Multinational
Corporation, the Financial Stability Board,
and the Global Governance Order
LARRY CATA BACKER'
ABSTRACT
Transnationalcorporations are at the center of extraordinary and
complex governance systems that are developing outside the state and
international public organizations and beyond the conventionally
legitimating framework of the forms of domestic or international hard
law. Though these systems are sometimes recognized as autonomous and
authoritative among its members, they are neither isolated from each
other nor from the states with which they come into contact. Together
these systems may begin to suggest a new template for networked
governance beyond the state, but one in which public and private actors
are integrated stakeholders. This provides the source of the questions
explored in this article: Is it possible to detect this new template for
transnational governance of economic activity (in general) and
corporations (in particular) developing through principles of
transnationalprivate governance? Is public governance in the twentyfirst century taking on the characteristics of transnational corporate
governance? The questions suggest three objectives. The first is to
examine the organizationof communities of states through the normative
lens of private transnationalgovernance. A secondary objective is to
* W. Richard and Mary Eshelman Faculty Scholar and Professor of Law, and
Professor, School of International Affairs, Pennsylvania State University. Please send
correspondence to Icb9ll@gmail.com. My thanks to my research assistants, Jana Viktoria
Nysten (LL.M., 2010, Pennsylvania State University), Su Jin Hong (J.D., 2011,
Pennsylvania State University), and Bret Stancil (J.D., 2013, Pennsylvania State
University) for excellent work on this project. An earlier version of this article was
presented as "Private Governance, Soft Law, and the Construction of Polycentric
Networks for the Regulation of Transnational Corporations" at the conference entitled
"Kongress: Transnationalismus in Recht, Staat und Gesellschaft," at the Universitat
Bremen, in Bremen, Germany, from March 3-5, 2010. My thanks to our host, Gralf-Peter
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suggest the importanceof communication-structuralcoupling-between
developing private governance systems and emerging transnational
public governance systems. That communication suggests the
development of the institutional intermeshing of both autonomous
systems of governing communities of private actors and communities of
states. The third objective is to consider whether emerging governance
frameworks, public and private, might be arranged together in a way
that credibly suggests a system of coordinated metagovernance. After an
introduction, Section I of this article examines the governance
constitutions of multinationaleconomic actors. Section II then turns to a
consideration of corporate constitutionalism within a metagovernance
framework. The focus is the governance framework of the G-20's
FinancialStability Board (FSB). The G-20-FSB framework points to the
future of governance systems in which the state participates in a
collaborative governance structure, but in which states share rulemaking power with public and private nonstate actors. The FSB
template points to the organization of governance as a collegial
enterprise in which states and traditional law-based systems interact
with nonstate actors and their norm-based systems to develop integrated
governance with global reach. Thus reconstituted, a new set of
arrangements might well arise, one in which amalgamationsof the most
powerful states and private regulatory bodies assert authority once
reserved to states alone.
INTRODUCTION

In the twentieth century, the "color line"I bedeviled efforts to
constitute political communities in accordance with their aspirational
and functional realities. It was grounded in notions of segregation
within constructed hierarchies built on the oppositional racial binary:
white and others. The color line demarcated borders between those who
regulate and those who are regulated; it suggested a hierarchy of
governance within which only one group was recognized as a legitimate
producer of regulation. The color line found its way into everything from
the internal social and political organization of states through law2 to

1. For the origin of the idea, see W.E.B. Du BOIs, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLKS: ESSAYS
AND SKETCHES, at vii-viii (1903). For the expression of the same sentiment from the other
side of the color line, see OSWALD SPENGLER, THE HOUR OF DECISION 204-29 (1934).
2. See generally, e.g., FRANK W. SWEET, LEGAL HISTORY OF THE COLOR LINE: THE
NOTION OF INVISIBLE BLACKNESS 117-80, 403-64 (2005) (discussing the color line in the
United States). As an apparatus of the Apartheid South African state see, for example,
Jonathan Hyslop, White Working-Class Women and the Invention of Apartheid: 'Purified"
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the construction of notions of sovereignty and the legitimacy of
subordination and colonization between states in international law. 3
Though the color line never accurately described the reality of social
organization or governance, its ideology proved to be durable.
If the color line was said to be one of the great issues of the
4
twentieth century, the conference organizers have described what can
usefully be understood, for this current century, as the rise of an equally
perverse construct, which I will call the "governance color line." On the
one side stands the state and with it a mechanics of legitimate
governance: law, sovereign will, democratic organization, force, and the
like. The state defines the universe of the public sphere. Since 1945, the
state has increasingly acted in concert through a vast array of public
organizations the governance authority of which is derived from or
dependent on the good will of the states supporting those entities
through the exercise of their legitimate mechanisms of asserting power.5
Together, these entities represented the full extent of legitimate public
power. It was to this public sphere that the ultimate will of a people
constituted as a state could be asserted through law.
Beyond this public sphere, all other governance communities and
systems, from the most mundane and local to the most elaborate and
pervasive, are rounded up in a "private sphere." This private sphere is
understood as subordinate to the state and subject to its regulation. 6it
has no authority to legislate; it governs through moral suasion, contract,
and the consent of the members of the group that subjects itself to
private order rule systems. It includes everything from established
churches, civil society organizations, and large multinational
corporations to informal associations of like-minded individuals that
come together for some purpose or other. These communities could be
quite informally structured or organized as elaborately as a state.

Afrikaner Nationalist Agitation for Legislation Against 'Mixed" Marriages, 1934-9, 36 J.
AFR. HIST. 57 (1995).
3. See, e.g., WESTEL W. WILLOUGHBY, THE FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF PUBLIC LAW
(1924). For a discussion, see, for example, ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY,
AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005).
4. An earlier version of this article was presented at the conference entitled
"Kongress: Transnationalismus in Recht, Staat und Gesellschaft," at the Universitat
Bremen, in Bremen, Germany, from March 3-5, 2010.
5. See, e.g., Jost E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS 1-57
(2006). For more on controversial aspects of these mechanisms see, for example, CYNTHIA
DAY WALLACE, LEGAL CONTROL OF THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 2-5 (1983). See also
infra pp. 6-7 and note 24.
6. For a discussion of the private sphere see, for example, Jennifer L. Johnson, PublicPrivate-PublicConvergence: How the PrivateActor Can Shape Public InternationalLabor
Standards,24 BROOK. J. INVL L. 291 (1998).
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However organized, they all tend to govern through the development of
-7
social norms.
This public-private divide is well-known and much maligned. On
the one hand, it is derided as a basis for organizing the state around
separable spheres, one public (political) and the other private
(economic/social/religious), that denigrates or subordinates activities
consigned to the private sphere. Conversely, it is criticized as an
attempt to legitimate principles of governance power beyond the state.10
In both cases, the emphasis on the power of nonstate actors to produce
rules that have a binding effect on others is viewed as illegitimate or
threatening, in the latter case either to the primacy of law-based
systems, or to the organization of the power to govern through states.
But globalization, with its de-emphasis on the integrity of the
territorial borders of states, destroyed the old presumption of a
substantiall complete identity between subjects and objects of
regulation. Because such private entities, especially large nonstate
actors, could avoid regulation in one single state by extending their
operations into the territory of other states, it became easier for these
entities to avoid political regulation and substitute themselves as new
regulators of behavior, each within the scope of its enterprise

7. For a discussion of social norms, see generally, Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and
Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996); as applied to governing private sphere actors

see, for example, Victor B. Flatt, Act Locally, Affect Globally: How Changing Social Norms
to Influence the Private Sector Shows a Path to Using Local Government to Control
Environmental Harms, 35 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 455 (2008).
8. See, e.g., JENNIFER A. ZERK, MULTINATIONALS AND CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY: LIMITATIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 61 (2006).
9. Feminist literature has made substantial contributions in this area. See, e.g.,

Shelley Wright, InterdisciplinaryApproaches to InternationalEconomic Law: Women and
the Global Economic Order:A Feminist Perspective, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 861, 862
(1995) ("Western liberal theory has constructed the private sphere of home, children and
domesticity as the space where women live and work for much of their time. This sphere
tends to be hidden-invisible to the public world of law, governments, States,
international institutions and transnational corporations-the sphere where men are said
to live and work.").

10. See generally, e.g., Oscar Schachter, The Decline of the Nation State and Its
Implications for InternationalLaw, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 7 (1998) (concerning the
impact of globalization on international law).
11. See, e.g., BARBARA EMADI-COFFIN, RETHINKING INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION:
DEREGULATION AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 1 (2002) ('The apparently contradictory
processes of fragmentation and globalization are not, despite empirical appearances, in
opposition, but are instead part of the historical development of the global political
economy. Fragmentation, unless extreme, serves to increase the number of states in the
system, thus dispersing national power.") (citing Robin Brown, Globalizationand the End
of the National Project, in BOUNDARIES IN QUESTION: NEW DIRECTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 54 (John Macmillan & Andrew Linklater eds., 1995)).
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operations.1 2 In some cases, it also permitted a Sreater degree of
freedom from regulation by others, including states. In other cases, it
suggested the ability of groups of nonstate actors to come together to
create autonomous regulatory communities or to offer regulatory
services to communities of other nonstate actors-for example by
creating a system of rules for sustainable environmental practices,
certification of compliance could then be offered to interested
companies. 14 At the dawn of the twenty-first century, then, these
entities and their governance organs could organize increasingly strong
formal and functional attacks on the monopoly of legitimate governance
authority asserted through the state. Beyond its functional effect,
vesting governance authority in private actors, an object of this
movement had the effect of questioning the organizing frameworks on
which the conventional global order has been based. Among the most
important of these are multinational corporationsIs and transnational
institutionalized religions.16
Multinational corporations are at the center of this extraordinary
and complex metastasis of governance outside the state, hard law, and
municipal law regimes. Within this emerging governance environment,
it is possible to conceive of corporations that can regulate themselvesby arranging their operations so that they are subject to the state
regulatory regimes of their choice. The resulting basket of regulation
more closely reflects the preferences of large enterprises with respect to
12. See generally GRALF-PETER CALLIEsS & PEER ZUMBANSEN, ROUGH CONSENSUS
RUNNING CODE: A THEORY OF TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE LAw (2010); Larry CatA Backer,

Multinational Corporationsas Objects and Sources of TransnationalRegulation, 14 ILSA
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 499 (2008).
13. See, e.g., Larry CatA Backer, The Autonomous Global Corporation:On the Role of
OrganizationalLaw Beyond Asset Partitioningand Legal Personality,41(4) TULSA L. REV.
541 (2006).

14. See generally Benjamin Cashore, Legitimacy and the Privatization of
Environmental Governance: How Non-state Market-Driven (NSMD) Governance Systems
Gain Rule-Making Authority, 15 GOVERNANCE: INT'L J. POL'Y 503 (2002).
15. For a discussion, see, for example, Tania Voon, MultinationalEnterprisesand State
Sovereignty under InternationalLaw, 21 ADEL. L. REV. 219 (1999).

16. See, e.g., Larry CatA Backer, Theocratic Constitutionalism:An Introduction to a
New Global Legal Ordering, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 85 (2009). More ominously,
political and economic actors without a state have increasingly institutionalized and
bureaucratized their organization, creating governments operated under a constitution
and subject to a juridified code of conduct overseen by an administrative structure. See,
e.g., Jayshree Bajoria & Greg Bruno, Backgrounder: al-Qaeda, COUNCIL FOREIGN REL.
(Apr.
18,
2008),
http://www.cfr.org/terrorist-organizations/al-qaeda-k-al-qaida-alqaidalp9126. Even more generally, religion has augmented its role in international public
sphere and as a consequence has increased its role in governance. See Rosalind I.J.

Hackett, Rethinking the Role of Religion in Changing Public Spheres: Some Comparative
Perspectives,2005 BYU L. REV. 659.
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the aggregate regulations to which they wish to be subject than the
imposition of popular will through the law of any single nation-state.17
It is also possible for these entities to intermesh, producing industrywide regulation. More interestingly, corporations, as private entities,
can develop autonomous governance systems for the management of
their global supply chain operations; regulating through contract, a
large multinational enterprise may more effectively harmonize the rules
under which a large group of globally scattered small suppliers operate
than would any multilateral public law efforts. 19 Free movement of
capital and operations has made it possible for the largest enterprises to
satisfy their regulatory preferences and impose their own rules within a
regulatory community in which corporations, investors, consumers,
nongovernmental organizations, and the media substitute for the state
and its organs.20 These autonomous systems are both institutionalized
and regulatory, but exist onl within specifically defined and
functionally distinct frameworks.
These movements and tensions have provoked strong reactions from
the state sector. The sense of the defensive position of the state is
illuminated nicely in recent comments of the President of the French
Republic, Mr. Nicolas Sarkozy, addressing the fortieth World Economic
Forum at Davos, Switzerland. Acknowledging
the seismic
rearrangement of governance power, which is the central concern of this
article, he declared: "We must now invent the State, the company and
the city of the 21st century."22 He offers a reconstituted state model that
rejects the idea of the irrelevance of the state, grounding the state's
renewed relevance in public-private linkages that privilege political

17. See Backer, supranote 13.

18. See, e.g., Dan Danielson, How Corporations Govern: Taking Corporate Power
Seriously in TransnationalRegulation and Governance, 46 HARV. INT'L. L.J. 411 (2005).
19. Wal-Mart's CEO H. Lee Scott spoke of the need for harmonization to satisfy its
stakeholders. Greg Levine, Scott Warns China Wal-Mart Suppliers Re "Standards,"
FORBES.COM (Oct. 20, 2005), http://www.forbes.com/2005/10/20/wmt-environment-ceoscxgl_020autofacescan08.html ('"The factories in China are going to end up having to be
held up to the same standards as the factories in the U.S.,' Scott said.").
20. See Larry Cati Backer, Economic Globalizationand the Rise of Efficient Systems of
Global PrivateLaw Making: Wal-Mart as Global Legislator, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1739, 1747
(2007).
21. See, e.g., MULTINATIONALS, ENVIRONMENT AND GLOBAL COMPETITION (Sarianna M.

Lundan ed., 2004) (concluding from empirical evidence that self-regulation seems to work
for environmental concerns because of, and to the extent of, the forces in the global
markets).
22. President Nicolas Sarkozy, Address at the 40th World Economic Forum in Davos,
Switzerland 6 (Jan. 27, 2010) [hereinafter Sarkozy Speech], (transcript available at
https://members.weforum.org/pdflSarkozy--.en.pdf).
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authority. 23 Sarkozy mocks the idea of the end of the state and the
advent of what he calls "nomadism" and a rediscovery of "nationality.",24
If Mr. Sarkozy's sentiments express the general sense of the highest
levels of the public sector, it might appear that an attempt to resurrect a
version of the governance "color line" is in the offing. But the reality
appears to be more complicated. In the form of an elite
intergovernmental construct, the so-called Group of Twenty (G-20), 25
and its principal instrumentality, the Financial Stability Board (FSB), 26
a new form of public sector governance appears to be emerging
alongside that of private governance systems. It is a governance
apparatus that is said to foreshadow planetary governance in this
century.27 To reinvent the state one must look to the governance
frameworks for private entities, especially those developed at the
supranational level. Public governance in the twenty-first century is
taking on the characteristics of transnational corporate governance.
This confrontation of the governance "color line" suggests the thesis
of this article: Is it possible to detect a basic template for transnational
governance of economic activity (in general) and corporations (in
particular) developing through principles of transnational private
governance? The objective of this article is to examine the organization
of communities of states through the normative lens of private
28
transnational governance.
A secondary objective is to suggest the
importance of communication between developing private governance
systems and emerging transnational public governance systems. But it
also suggests the possibility of governance fusion. Thus, the third
objective of this exploration is to examine the plausibility of the
suggestion that emerging governance frameworks, public and private,
might be arranged together in a way that credibly suggests a system of
coordinated metagovernance.
23. Id. ("[W]hat remains to be done is to ... invent a new linkage between public action
and private initiative.").
24. Id.

25. See About G-20, G-20, http://www.g20.org/about-what-is-g20.aspx (last visited July
3, 2011) ('The Group of Twenty ( G-20) Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors was

established in 1999 to bring together systemically important industrialized and developing
economies to discuss key issues in the global economy."); see also G-20, THE GROUP OF
TWENTY: A HISTORY 42-43 (2008), available at www.g20.utoronto.caldocs/g2Ohistory.pdf
('The key distinguishing feature of the G-20 has been its membership. No other forum has
brought together a regionally representative group of systemically important developed and
emerging economies for informal discussion and dialogue. The G-20 filled an important gap
in the governance structure of the international economic and financial system.").
26. See
generally
Overview,
FIN.
STABLITY
BOARD,
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/about/overview.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2011).

27. Sarkozy Speech, supra note 22.
28. See generally CALLESS & ZUMBANSEN, supra note 12.
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This metagovernance system is constituted through frameworks of
institutional communication-structural coupling-that link and order
a rising set of governance subsystems. 29 These governance subsystems
include a host of private governance systems (multinational
corporations asserting governance over their supply chains through
contractual and other relationships), global governance frameworks for
private governance,30 and autonomous corporate constitutionalism. 3 1
From out of this cosmos of distinct but intertwined systems, one can see
emerging a distinct polycentric system of transnational corporate
governance made up of the continuous interactions of dynamic private
and soft law systems. The form of this governance is cooperative and
public. It is state-centered but not exclusively so.32 The FSB governance
framework suggests both the contours of polycentric governance and the
points of cooperation and tension among such governance communities,
as functionally distinct regulatory communities seek to preserve their
autonomy and cooperate within interlinked regulatory streams. Yet this
does not suggest the disappearance of transnational private governance
so much as the metamorphosis of the state in the face of the movement
of governance power beyond territorial borders.
29. This suggests Gunther Teubner's framework for the construction of an autonomous
constitutional basis for enterprise communities through the hypercyclidity of linked
systems of private and public codes of corporate governance. See Gunther Teubner, Self

ConstitutionalizingTNCs?: On the Linkage of 'Private"and "Public"Corporate Codes of
Conduct, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. (2011).
30. Among the most important current iterations of this approach is the United
Nations' Protect, Respect, Remedy framework. See The Special Representative of the

Secretary-General, Business and Human Rights: Towards Operationalisingthe 'Protect,
Respect and Remedy" Framework, delivered to the Human Rights Council and the General
Assembly U.N. Doc. A/HRC/11/13 (April 22, 2009), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/
english/issues/globalization/business/docs/A.HRC.11.13.pdf.
31. These consist of the following three principal Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) guidelines for the conduct of corporations: OECD, PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2004), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/
32/18/31557724.pdf; OECD, GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (2011), available
at http:Iwww.oecd.org/dataoeed/43/29/48004323.pdf; OECD, GUIDELINES ON CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES (2005), availableat http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/46/51/34803211.pdf. See also Larry Cati Backer, Transnational Corporate
Constitutionalism: The U.N. Global Compact, the OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises and the Emergence of a Constitutional Order for Economic Enterprises, Address
at the Copenhagen Business School Conference: The Constitutionalization of the Global
Corporate Sphere? (Sept. 17-18, 2009), available at http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/
2009/09/transnational-corporate.html.

32. Compare Gregory T. Euteneier, Towards a Corporate "Law of Nations":
Multinationals Contribution to Customary InternationalLaw, 82 TUL. L. REV. 757 (2007)
(holding state and nonstate actors to same standard), with Thomas F. McInerney, Putting

Regulation Before Responsibility: The Limits of Voluntary Corporate Social Responsibility,
2 VOICES DEV. JURISTS, no. 3, 2005 (privileging states as enforcement vehicles).
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The analysis produces irony: to save the state, the state itself must
adapt to the governance frameworks of private transnational
governance bodies. Thus reconstituted, a new set of arrangements
might well arise, in which amalgamations of the most powerful states
and private regulatory bodies assert authority once reserved to states
alone. But it also suggests more: in particular, the weakening of the
border between hard and soft law even within public sector governance.
The convergence of form suggests a functional convergence of
governance-the private corporation with public obligations, and the
regulatory state that participates in markets. Public and private
corporate bodies, once divided by an insurmountable conceptual barrier,
now become mirrors of one another. "No question, now, what had
happened to the faces of the pigs. The creatures outside looked from pig
to man, and from man to pig, and from pig to man again; but already it
was impossible to say which was which." 3
I. THE GOVERNANCE CONSTITUTIONS OF MULTINATIONAL ECONOMIC
ACTORS

The focus on governance by nonstate entities acknowledges a reality
about which there is growing academic attention. 3 4 Indeed, even law
has slowly, 35 if gracelessly, moved to recognize the "transnational" in
36
law and its relation to the study of the governance systems of nonstate
actors, 37 though the nature and substance of this interaction remains

33. GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM 113 (1945).
34. See, e.g., BEYOND MARKET AND HIERARCHY: INTERACTIVE GOVERNANCE AND SOCIAL
COMPLEXITY (Ash Amin & Jersy Hausner eds., 1997); EMADI-COFFIN, supra note 11.

35. See, e.g., Craig Scott, 'TransnationalLaw" as Proto-Concept:Three Conceptions, 10
GERMAN L.J. 859 (2009); Peer Zumbansen, TransnationalLaw, 4 COMP. RES. L. & POL.

ECON., no. 2, 2008.
36. See, e.g., Mathias Reiman, From the Law of Nations to TransnationalLaw: Why We
Need a New Basic Course for the InternationalCurriculum, 22 PENN ST. INT'L L. REV. 397,
401-09 (2004); Harold Hongju Koh, Remarks at the Wednesday Luncheon Session of the
83rd Annual Meeting of the American Law Institute in the State Room of the Mayflower
Hotel, Washington, D.C.
(May 17,
2006), available at http://www.ali.org/
index.cfm?fuseaction=news.transcripts.
37. See, e.g., MULTINATIONALS, ENVIRONMENT AND GLOBAL COMPETITION, supra note
21; Danielson, supra note 18; Andreas Georg Scherer, Guido Palazzo & Dorothbe

Braumann, Global Rules and Private Actors-Towards a New Role of the Transnational
Corporation in Global Governance, in INTERNATIONALES MANAGEMENT IM UMBRUCH 3

(Michael-Jorg Oesterle ed., 2007); Larry Cati Backer, Principles of Transnational Law:
The Foundations of an Emerging Field, LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY (Mar. 9, 2007),
http://1cbackerblog.blogspot.com/2007/03/principles-of-transnational-law.html.
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highly contested. 38 However strong its internal coherence as a field of
legal study, transnational law's single-minded focus on the governance
systems of functionally distinct regulatory communities of nonstate
actors has made it possible to better understand these systems as selfreferential, autonomous, closed systems with their own internal
regulatory dynamic, fully constituted and able to communicate
(interact) effectively with other governance systems within, above, and
around the state. 39 The key to understanding these systems lies in their
distinct constitutions, their relationship to other communities, and their
relationships with the members of their communities. These membercreated systems focus on serving the needs of the group. The essence of
that creation lies in the objectives of the group, which need not all be
the same. That suggests a fundamental challenge to the homogeneity
that serves as a basic premise of the state order-an inversion of the
premises of governance legitimacy. All states are created for the same
purpose and function along similar lines using a standardized set of
tools (whatever the variation in implementation, which itself forms the
essence of the science of politics). Transnational nonstate governance
theories suggest a fundamental break with the three-legged stool of
legitimate governance-state, law, and territory. Nonstate entities now
govern through regulatory techniques that might mimic and sometimes
supplement or supplant, but are not effectuated through law, nor are
grounded in jurisdictional limits measured by "metes and bounds."4 0
More importantly, such governance is not necessarily understood as
derived from or subordinate to this three-legged stool of legitimacy.
Governance has been moving from a mindless servant of hierarchy and
unity to a more horizontally constituted and networked set of
governance orders in which states participate but do not necessarily
subordinate to their own governance orders.

38. Compare Paul Schiff Berman, International Law to Law and Globalization, 43
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 485 (2005), with Pierrick Le Goff, Global Law: A Legal
Phenomenon Emerging from the Process of Globalization, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.
119 (2007).
39. See, e.g., Bruce L. Benson, The Spontaneous Evolution of Commercial Law, 55 S.
EcoN. J. 644 (1989); David Friedman, Private Creation and Enforcement of Law: A
Historical Case, 8 J. LEGAL STuD. 399 (1979); Gunther Teubner, Societal
Constitutionalism: Alternatives to
State-Centered Constitutional Theory?,
in
TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 3, 10-18 (Christian Joerges,
Inger-Johanne Sand & Gunther Teubner eds., 2004); Claudia R. Williamson, Informal
Institutions Rule: Institutional Arrangements and Economic Performance, 139 PUB.
CHOICE 371 (2009).
40. This is the traditional system under the common law for the measurement and
description of the borders of real estate.

PRIVATE ACTORS AND PUBLIC GOVERNANCE BEYOND THE STATE 761

Indeed, a rising mountain of studies (whether or not self-consciously
denominated transnational) has made it increasingly difficult to dispute
that at least one group of nonstate actors, multinational enterprises,
now comprise a group of autonomous, functionally differentiated
organizations which, within the scope of their authority, have exercised
regulatory authority.41 They present the institutionalized face to a
phenomenon made possible by the effects of globalization, which are
said to reduce the importance of borders as regulatory devices and lay
bare the weakness of governmental power, especially among least
developed states.42 These enterprises have exercised their regulatory
authority to produce law, understood more broadly than as the product
of a legislature or court.4 3 Still, that exercise of regulatory power has
been effectuated within a closed regulatory system with its own
internally cohesive rules of interpretation and dispute resolution. 44
Within a global regulatory context in which "[n]o one is in charge,', 5
the approaches to regulation of large multinational corporations has
become both as complex and as contested a subject as the regulation of
states within a transnational or international framework. Currently,
among the corporate social responsibility (CSR) community, there are
three principal approaches to the deployment of CSR in the context of
corporate regulation-the extraterritorial application of the (favored)
laws of certain jurisdictions (usually from developed states); the
development of substantive rules of corporate responsibility as
international law (usually reflecting the position of developing states
though serving the policy objectives of portions of developing-state
elites); and privatization of corporate regulation beyond the traditional

41. See, e.g., Tim Bithe, Governance Through Private Authority: Nonstate Actors in
World Politics, 58 J. INT'L AFF. 281 (2004); Peter T. Muchlinski, "Global Bukowina"
Examined: Viewing the Multinational Enterprise as a Transnational Law-Making
Community, in GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE 79 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997). See
generally Virginia Haufler, Beyond Government: Business Self-Regulation in International
Affairs (Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace, Study Group on the Role of the Private
Sector, Discussion Paper no. 1), available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/
publications/index.cfm?fa-view&id=583.
42. See, e.g., Peter T. Leeson & Peter J. Boettke, Two Tiered Entrepreneurship and
Economic Development, 29 INT'L REV. L. & EcON. 252 (2009).
43. See, e.g., Marc Amstutz, Global (Non-)Law: The Perspective of Evolutionary
Jurisprudence, 9 GERMAN L.J. 465, 474-76 (2008) (distinguishing characteristics that
separate law from nonlaw).
44. For a traditional application in public law, see Joachim Wieland, Germany in the
European Union-The Maastricht Decision of the Bundesverfassungsgericht, 5 EUR. J.
INVL L. 259 (1994). The same idea can be said to apply to internally closed nonstate
governance systems. See Backer, supranote 20.
45. THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LExUS AND THE OLIVE TREE 112 (1999) (emphasis
removed).
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scope of corporate governance.46 Multinational corporations have
exercised governance in two distinct forms of particular interest to this
article. The first is with respect to internal systems of governance across
the entire spectrum of the operations of an enterprise. This involves not
merely internal governance rules, sometimes better known when taking
the notorious form of "voluntary codes," 47 but also the framework for
managing relationships among all the factors of production of corporate
activity up and down the corporate supply chain. The second is
exercised among the community of enterprises. This form of governance
has been effectuated through purely private efforts,48 or more famously,
public-private organs, and memorialized in soft law rules 49 and
enforcement systems. Each is described in turn.
A. The Self-Regulating Corporation
One can understand the internal regulation of the corporation in
two respects. The first is the development of an internal corporate
constitution. This singular corporate constitutionalism has been well
explored, though somewhat pessimistically. 50 The second is the
development of an external corporate constitution. This is perhaps
better understood as the appearance of a self-constituting substantive
organizational framework within the entity and its factors of production
and interaction. This supply chain corporate constitutionalism has been
developed in studies of the enterprise operations of large multinational
corporations. 5 1 In both aspects, the corporate enterprise changes its
fundamental character. It ceases to function solely as an object of law
46. See ZERK, supra note 8.

47. See, e.g., Canada Office of Consumer Affairs, Voluntary Codes Guide-What Is a
Voluntary Code?, INDUSTRY CANADA, http://www.ic.gc.caleic/site/oca-bc.nsfleng/

ca00963.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2011).
48. Consider product certification programs that have harmonized standards for
product conformance to basic human rights notions. See, e.g., Errol Meidinger, MultiInterest Self-Governance Through Global Product Certification Programmes, in
RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS: SELF-GOVERNANCE AND THE LAW IN TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC

TRANSACTIONS 259 (Olaf Dilling, Martin Herberg & Gerd Winter eds., 2008).
49. See, e.g., Anna di Robilant, Genealogies of Soft Law, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 499 (2006).

50. See Gunther Teubner, The Corporate Codes of Multinationals: Company
ConstitutionsBeyond Corporate Governance and Co-Determination,in CONFLICT OF LAWS
AND LAWS OF CONFLICT IN EUROPE AND BEYOND: PATTERNS OF SUPRANATIONAL AND

TRANSNATIONAL JURIDIFICATION 203 (Rainer Nickel ed., 2010).

51. See, e.g., Fabrizio Cafaggi, Private Regulation, Supply Chain and Contractual
Networks: The Case of Food Safety, (Robert Schman Ctr. for Advanced Studies, European
Univ. Inst. Working Paper No. 10, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=1554329; Ans Kolk & Rob Van Tulder, The Effectiveness of SelfRegulation: CorporateCodes of Conduct and Child Labour, 20 EuR. MGMT. J. 260 (2002).
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and assumes a (self-) regulatory role. But the character of that selfregulation is different. In the former case, the corporation assumes a
power over its internal constitution within the ambit of state regulation.
In the latter case, the corporation reverses roles with the state; it
becomes a consumer of regulation. The state becomes the merchant;
regulation becomes the principal commodity produced by states for
"sale" to geographically mobile economic entities.
1. Internal Regulation
It is now possible to speak of the internal constitution of the
corporation as an autonomous, coherent, and closed regulatory system
in a way that might have been incomprehensible even a decade ago.52
The analysis posits that
[tihe distinctive regulatory problem posed by MNCs
[Multi-National Corporations] is their ability to operate
an integrated command and control system through two
disaggregated institutional structures. The first of these
structures is the collection of discrete corporate unitsparent, subsidiary, sister, and cousin companies-that
make up the MNC group. The second disaggregated
structure housing the MNC is the global system of
separate nation-states in which those corporations are
registered and do business. 5 3
In the usual case, this regulatory autonomy centers on the ability of
a firm to avoid distasteful (to it) regulations relating to its operations.
By carefully choosing the place, form, and method of operation, it can
effectively decide the manner in which it will be regulated. States may
legislate, but the enterprise will submit to those regulations only to the
extent they are either unavoidable or desirable (i.e., profitable). The
recent change of domicile of the American corporation Halliburton
provides a telling example. 54 From the perspective of the self-regulating
corporation, the role of states has changed. No longer holders of a
monopoly power to regulate the enterprise, states are now, from this
perspective, understood as mere producers of a good-regulation-that
52. See Backer, supra note 12.

53. Eric Engle, ExtraterritorialCorporate Criminal Liability: A Remedy for Human
Rights Violations?, 20 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 287, 300 (2006).
54. Christine Lagorio, Halliburton's Dubai Move Sparks Outcry, CBS NEWS ONLINE
(Mar. 12, 2007),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/03/12/business/main2558620.shtml.
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can be characterized as a cost of operations. "Competition [is] not just
between products, but also between governance systems." 55
Self-regulatory autonomy requires coherence within a system of
rules complete enough to provide closure, and sufficiently
bureaucratically developed to permit elaboration, application, and
enforcement. Within the model of the self-regulatory global corporation
described above, this coherence is effectuated through the ability to
move operations between regulating public jurisdictions, the adoption of
voluntary codes and rules of internal conduct, and the adherence to
voluntary standards developed by communities of public and private
supranational regulators. 56 Together, these provide a basis of rules that
can order a large range of corporate operations, and that can be enforced
through contract. Enforcement can be effectuated privately, through
arbitration and related methods, or by invoking the judicial systems of
appropriate states. In the latter case, of course, there is evidence of the
sort of structural coupling that is an everyday feature of coherent
systems.58
But the possibility of both coherence and autonomy of such internal
regulation of nonstate actors has also been questioned. The strongest
criticism of the possibility of autonomous self-governance is based on
the soft law forms in which this closed regulatory construct is often
elaborated. Specifically, because corporate self-governance is essentially
grounded in soft law, it may represent a successful effort to privatize
public regulation more than the liberation of corporations from the
regulatory matrix of the state. This suggestion finds its most interesting
expression in recent work by Gunther Teubner.5 9 He suggests a
contradiction in the turn to soft law as an alternative to conventional
public law, which moves power away from both state and shareholder. 60
The contradiction of soft law that exhibits critical characteristics of
hard law, that is, of soft law that operates functionally like hard law,
but that is not hard law because it was not produced through the
procedures specified for the production of law under the conditions
55. Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or
Function, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 329, 330 (2001).
56. See ZERK, supra note 8.
57. Backer, supra note 20, at 1753.
58. On structural coupling among autonomous but interrelated systems, see, for

example, Niklas

Luhmann,

Operational Closure and Structural Coupling: The

Differentiationof the Legal System, 13 CARDoZO L. REV. 1419, 1420 (1992); Marc Amstutz,

The Letter of the Law: Legal Reasoning in a Societal Perspective, 10 GERMAN L.J. 361, 376
(2009); Gunther Teubner, How the Law Thinks: Toward a Constructivist Epistemology of
Law, 23 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 727, 737 (1989).
59. Teubner, supra note 50.

60. Id. at 1.
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specified in the constitutions of states, has important consequences.
This contradiction suggests a resolution outside the parameters of
conventional state-law constructs. What is "voluntary" within the
domestic legal orders of states can be understood as mandatory within
the governance systems of those who have adopted the "voluntary"
regimes. As far as they are concerned, the voluntary rules are
mandatory within the parameters of their governance system. 6 1
Whatever their character, "when they were first spawned, they are no
longer mere public relations strategies; instead, they have matured into
genuine civil constitutions-in the fashion of constitutional pluralism." 62
Teubner advances five factors contributing to the evolution of soft law
regimes, of governance without government, which he calls
juridification, constitutionalization, judicialization, hybridization, and
intermeshing.63 Yet, it is not clear whether these institutionalist
tendencies have produced governance without government; that is, the
rise of fictive governance that supports fictive entities beyond the
control of the state, or merely a vehicle for the privatization of
governance still controlled by the state.64 Autonomy, however, can be
enhanced through a "strength in numbers" strategy Teubner identifies
as "intermeshing,"65 a private sector variant of the governance
structures of the European Union.6 6 Intermeshing will play a key role in
the construction of a new model of transnational public governance in
the form of the FSB.
But there are other methods of autonomous internal regulation
beyond the construction of private supra-entity governance intermeshed
frameworks. The first involves privatization of standard setting. The
second involves delegation of substantive standards for products or
61. See, e.g., Larry Cati Backer, Part I: The OECD, Vedanta, & the Indian Supreme
Court-Polycentricity, Transnational Corporate Governance and John Ruggie's
Protect/Respect Framework, LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY (Nov. 3, 2009),
http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2009/11/part-ii-oecd-vedanta-indian-supreme.html.
62. Teubner, supra note 50, at 2.
63. Id.; see also Teubner, supra note 39, at 16.
64. There is always a danger, Teubner relates, that such codes will become little more
than the privatized expression of public law. Teubner, supranote 50, at 9. Already there is
a great tendency among Western states to do just that, as well as to exercise governance
indirectly. See Larry Cat6 Backer, Surveillance and Control: Privatizing and
Nationalizing CorporateMonitoringAfter Sarbanes-Oxley, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 327.
65. Teubner, supra note 50, at 9-10.
66. Just as the Member States of the European Union together might create broader
and more powerfully effective cross-state norms, so too might multinational "states" do the
same within cooperative regulatory communities. Thus, Teubner notes "the emergence of
intercompany networks as an extension of the corporate code onto an entire production
network. Global commodity chains have developed, which constitute neither market
relationships nor integrated multinationals." Id. at 9.
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corporate behavioral norms to nongovernmental organizations. Private
sector standard setting or certification bodies are nongovernmental
organizations that provide either product or behavior standards or
certification of product quality based on compliance with certain rules.67
Compliance with globalized standards is now critical for the functioning
of global economic markets. These standards apply with equal strength
to the largest multinational corporation and the smallest supplier in a
complex supply chain.68 Standard setting bodies represent both private
centers of governance and effectively coordinated public-private
governance through well-institutionalized interactions.69 Standard
setting has provided a means through which governments have
privatized governance while retaining authority over the larger objects
of policy. 70 Standard setting is not limited to products but may also
touch on process or behavior, once the exclusive domain of law. One
area meriting attention is that of corporate governance.n The
International Organization for Standardization's (ISO) recently
launched international standard guidelines addressing 72CSR, to be
codified as ISO 26000, provides a useful example.
Standards
compliance is sometimes also enhanced by third-party evaluation
67. See Steven Bernstein & Erin Hannah, Nonstate Global Standard Setting and the
WTO: Legitimacy and the Need for Regulatory Space, 11 J. INT'L ECON. L. 575 (2008)
(suggesting that the development of transnational social and environmental standards
might pose a challenge to another transnational governance system, that of the WTO and
describing solutions).
68. See, e.g., Khalid Nadvi, Global Standards,Global Governance and the Organization
of Global Value Chains, 8 J. ECON. GEOGRAPHY 323 (2008) (using the case of Nike's
termination of a supplier agreement with its Pakistani manufacturer of soccer balls to
analyze the relationship between standards and governance).
69. Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Strengthening International Regulation
Through TransnationalNew Governance: Overcoming the OrchestrationDeficit, 42 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 501, 547 (2009).

70. For the approach of the European Union, see Opinion of the Economic and Social
Committee on the Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European
Parliament on Technical Harmonizationand Standards: A New Approach, 1985 0.J. (C
169) 15.
71. See Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Shifting the Point of Regulation: The International
Organizationfor Standardizationand Global Lawmaking on Trade and the Environment,
22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 479, 489-91 (1995).
72. See INTERNATIONAL STANDARD

FOR ORGANIZATION,

GUIDANCE

ON

SOCIAL

RESPONSIBILITY (2010). See also Future ISO 26000 standard on social responsibility
published as Draft InternationalStandard,INT'L ORG. STANDARDIZATION (Sept. 14, 2009),

http://www.iso.org/iso/pressrelease.htm?refid=Refl245. This project is new in the sense
that the guidelines are not certifiable-thus, they are not standards with standardized
compliance. For a critical review of the process of development and the potential effects of
ISO 26000 on small and medium-sized enterprises, see OSHANI PERERA, How MATERIAL IS
ISO 26000 SoCIAL RESPONSIBILITY TO SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES (SMEs)?

(2008), http://www.iisd.org/pdfl2008/how-material_iso_26000.pdf.
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entities. The most common examples are the debt- and credit-rating
agencies. The methodologies and standards used to issue ratings can
have profound effects on markets and behavior, as individuals,
companies and states modify their behavior to maximize their rating
potential. 7
More directly relevant to governance are certification programs,
through which nongovernmental actors certify compliance with their
published standards. 74 Certification is available for both products and
operations. 7 5 Certification mimics public regulation-a third-party
organization creates a set of standards grounded in substantive values
for the production of a product and then offers to certify corporate
compliance with these standards. Complying companies can then
advertise their certification as proof of compliance with a set of thirdparty standards that advances certain social, economic, political,
ethical, or other values. In some instances, certification is used as a
supplement to internal corporate constitution making.76 In the form of
social accountability standards, these programs provide a supranational
institutional framework for the development of corporate behavior
standards that are regulatory in effect but not dependent on the
substantive law of any particular state. Their effects, especially within
developing states, can be profound, and their harmonizing effects
substantial.7 7
These efforts suggest a different vector of governance-the
deployment of autonomous entities to serve as the institutionalized
source of substantive values and rules for the social conduct of economic
actors. These rules become binding because corporations embrace them.
When the certification standards do not reflect customary notions
among the communities of actors affected thereby, then they are not
73. See, e.g., Dieter Kerwer, Standardizing as Governance: The Case of Credit Rating
Agencies, in COMMON GOODS: REINVENTING EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE
293 (Adrienne Hdritier ed., 2002).
74. 'Third-party independent product certification is the most reputable, because it
ensures that a neutral body representing the interests of all the parties ... governs the
certification process." Certification in Brief, BUYER BE FAIR: THE PROMISE OF PRODUCT
CERTIFICATION, http://www.buyerbefair.org/certificationbrief.html (last visited Jan. 20,
2011).

75. See, e.g., Tracy Cooper, Picture This: Promoting Sustainable Fisheries Through
Eco-Labeling and Product Certification,10 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 1, 2 (2004-2005).
76. Margaret M. Blair, Cynthia A. Williams & Li-Wen Lin, The New Role for Assurance
Services in Global Commerce, 33 J. CORP. L. 325, 343 (2008). "In this way, multinational
firms may be drawing more small and local firms in more countries into their orbit." Id. at
338.

77. See Li-Wen Lin, Corporate Social Accountability Standards in the Global Supply
Chain: Resistance, Reconsideration, and Resolution in China, 15 CARDOZO J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 321 (2007).
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embraced and the standards provider either changes its standards or
abandons the field. Still, two points are important here, for both the
construction of autonomous sources of corporate behavior and patterns
of governance. The first is the importance of the third-party standards
model as a source of governance rules. The second is the supranational
and institutional character of these third-party providers. Together,
product or standards certification provides substantial evidence of the
power of private entities and groups to organize themselves to develop
commonly applicable standards as well as the mechanisms to
implement these certification systems. It also provides evidence of the
customary character of these standards. To succeed they must reflect
the customs and values of the parties-radical positivism is not likely to
be successful in these efforts precisely because these standards are all
grounded on the consent of the parties to them.

2. The Corporationas Regulator of FunctionallyDifferentiated
Production Units
It is hardly enough to consider corporate governance autonomy
merely by reference to its internal constitution. Its external
constitution-the frameworks through which it autonomously regulates
behavior among its important stakeholders-adds an important facet to
institutionalization and the reach of private governance among nonstate
actors. The corporate external constitution evidences networked
governance within a chain of relationships that bind a corporation, for
example, to customers, investors, suppliers, and monitors. These
networks seek to harmonize behavior among a larger set of actors
within the strict bounds of the relationships among them.
It is in its relationships with its supply chain that the autonomy of
corporate governance can be discerned. In these contexts, the
corporation does not merely seek to regulate itself-either by
strategically moving its assets to achieve an appropriate mix of
regulatory environments for the various facets of its operations, or
through the application of externally produced voluntary codes as a sort
of corporate constitutionalism. Instead, it seeks to regulate its
relationships with other individuals and entities that contribute to its
own productivity. Alternatively, corporations seek to regularize
behavior through the application of behavioral norms or standards
nongovernmental
by
other
groups-particularly
generated
organizations that certify products and set standards, or standardsetters concerned with substantive rules for product production and
quality.
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But these regulatory entities are not states. Nor do they have access
to the full palette of coercive measures that make states such powerful
internal actors. And the extent of regulatory power is not great. But the
power of participation may sometimes be as strong. Moreover, narrow
regulatory power, that is, the power to set rules only about matters with
respect to which the community was formed, does not detract from the
effectiveness of that regulation. These communities can exist within and
around states. They seek to engage in regulation at the interstices of
lawmaking, where law either does not or cannot provide a basis for
effective regulation. 78 Most important, they operate through the
medium of soft law-regulation through policy and contract. These
instruments do not serve as a conduit for the imposition of the law of a
single domestic legal order. Instead, they represent the construction of
private regulatory environments through an internalization of
transnational public and private norms.7 9 Within these systems, the
individual state may play a role but a distinctly secondary one.
International organizations, groups of states acting together to produce
a common position on matters of substantive conduct, play a larger role
in the generation of norms that may be adopted by these economic selfregulators. It is possible to see in the construction of the harmonizing
regulations of multinational corporations throughout their supply
chains, a freestanding, autonomous, self-communicating system,
generating enforceable conduct rules binding on its constituency and
accountable to a well-defined constituency.8 0
These regulatory regimes are not effectuated using the well-known
tools of state regulation-positive law and judicial and administrative
decisions. Rather, contract serves as the means b which the "law" of
this system is memorialized and made binding.
Like its political
counterpart, the regulating multinational enterprise is as much a
prisoner of its own stakeholders (and principally its consumers and
investors) as any state is to its citizens and residents. Nor are these
regulatory collectives disconnected from the regulatory role of the state
(or collections of states); autonomy is not meant to suggest isolation.
"Similarly, legal subsystems coexisting in isolation from the remaining
bulk of international law are inconceivable. There will always be some
78. See Paul Schiff Berman, Cyberspace and the State Action Debate: The Cultural
Value of Applying ConstitutionalNorms to "Private"Regulation, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1263
(2000) (discussing regulation of the Internet).
79. See supra notes 60-78. This idea is nicely captured in Gralf-Peter Calliess and Peer
Zumbansen's notion of rough consensus and running code that reorients the question of
"when and how norms are recognized as law." CALLIESS & ZUMBANSEN, supra note 12.
80. For an elaboration, see, for example, Backer, supra note 12; Backer, supra note 20;
Cafaggi, supranote 51; Kolk & Van Tulder, supra note 51.
81. Backer, supra note 12.
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degree of interaction, at least at the level of interpretation."82 But it
does suggest that the traditional element of complete subordination to
the will of a state is absent, even as the corporate entity navigates
among state domestic legal orders, international legal norms, and the
governance frameworks of investors and competitors.
Law is a useful medium in these communications between the state
and its people (an internal communication that deepens the selfconscious separation of that community from others) and between the
state system (that speaks through law) and other (social) systems of
governance. In this sense, law serves as both the means through which
normative standards are manifested (effectively merging the form of law
with its substance), and the method through which normative standards
can be conveyed and preserved authoritatively to both those who are
bound and those who may be interested (effectively merging the form of
law with the techniques of communication). Law, then, serves as a
means to couple (or communicate) between law and its social context in
the interactions between legal and social systems. But social norms,
the governance language of nonstate systems, can serve similar
functions going in the other direction. A recent important example
involves the development of corporate regulatory systems that
supplement or supplant product content regulation. 84
The corporation as the center of systems of functionally distinct
supply-chain-driven governance units suggests another set of
institutional governance patterns that will become influential in the
construction of supranational public governance. The first is the
importance of functional jurisdictional limits. Corporate external
constitutions are effective only to the extent they relate to their specific
objects. The second is the importance of consent in the operation of
these systems. Consent in the corporate context is expressed through
contract and the maintenance of economic or social relations. Third is
the fundamental importance of monitoring, disclosure, and surveillance
as a tool of governance. These are not systems of clear positive law so
much as systems grounded in the indirect implementation of principles

82. Bruno Simma & Dirk Pulkowski, Of Planets and the Universe: Self-Contained
Regimes in InternationalLaw, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 483, 492 (2006).
83. Luhmann, supra note 58, at 1419; Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants:Good Faith in
British Law or How Unifying Law Ends Up in New Divergences, 61 MOD. L. REV. 11
(1998).
84. See Lyndsey Layton, Wal-Mart bypasses federal regulatorsto ban controversialflame
retardant, WASH. POsT, (Feb. 26, 2011,

10:13 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/

wpdyn/content/article/2011/02/25/AR2011022502977.html (discussing Wal-Mart's initiative
in banning polybrominated diphenyl ethers (PBDEs) from its stores in response to consumer
advocacy complaints).

PRIVATE ACTORS AND PUBLIC GOVERNANCE BEYOND THE STATE 771

through the mechanics of monitoring, disclosure, and evaluation of
compliance.
Corporate regulators operate autonomously but in a stream of
constant communication with states and other public and private
regulatory
authorities.
Law
systems
do
the
same. An
institutionalization of the networking of these formative and
communicative functions would provide a mechanism for coordination
and harmonization among systems that might reinforce the autonomy of
each through a framework within which competitive cooperation is
possible.8 5 We leave behind the classical model of the rule-of-law state
grounded in positive (or customary) law pronounced by an authoritative
body clothed in the legislative power, and enter the world of the
panopticon and the disciplines. 86
B. The Corporationas Subject/Object of InternationalPublic/Private
Governance
The difficulties of regulatory autonomy and coherence might be
ameliorated where communities of corporations (and other nonstate
actors), like the community of states, come together for the elaboration
of governance frameworks that can exist autonomously. Commentators
looking elsewhere have increasingly noted the rise of alternative
systems of regulation that cut across borders, either hybrid systems or
regulatory systems based on private law. From the perspective of selfregulating corporations, this opens an even greater set of possibilities
for fashioning an internal regulatory framework that suits them, rather
than any single political community seeking to assert exclusive
regulatory authority.
The external constitutions of the corporation are not purely the
product of internal dynamics. As functionally differentiated units well
networked within the webs of the powerful relationships that constitute
interinstitutional social, political, and economic relations, the
constitutions of corporations are also subject to contribution from
beyond the "territory" of corporate power. It is apparent that in the form
of the modern multinational corporation, large aggregations of private
power can, and often do, overwhelm the more limited and territorially
85. See Larry CatA Backer, Inter-Systemic Harmonization and Its Challenges for the
Legal-State, in THE LAW OF THE FUTURE AND THE FUTURE OF THE LAW 427-37 (Sam Muller
et al. eds., forthcoming 2011).
86. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 176-77
(Alan Sheridan trans., 1977).
87. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global
Convergence in CorporateGovernance and Its Implications, 93 Nw. U. L. REv. 641 (1999).
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based public power, especially (but not exclusively) of small states.8 8
These entities might subvert not only the traditional order hierarchy
represented by the state, but also the global monopoly of power
represented in the public power. The danger is similar to that posed by
the largest states during the first half of the twentieth century, whose
unchecked power threatened to unbalance the state system through
singular application of public power.
Just as one antidote to unbalanced, uncontrolled state power served
as an incentive to the construction of the international system after
1945, a cure to imbalances in power between public and private
corporate bodies might be provided by the construction of a framework
for cooperative governance existing at a level beyond either state or
corporate governance. These more recent efforts point not merely to the
efforts at the construction of a soft law (that is, a nonstate) rule
framework to govern these new nonstate bearers of governance power,
but these efforts also suggest a pattern for the governance of regulatory
systems of nonstate (mostly economic) actors in which public bodies
participate directly (and states indirectly). They also suggest a pattern
for the governance of the regulatory systems of states in which private
bodies participate. For that purpose, state collectives have sought to
construct governance frameworks that mimic those being developed by
private organs. Specifically, the models of third-party certification and
standard setting have produced a public sector analogue.
The effort has sought to construct a "mixed" governance framework,
in which groups of states produce norms. There is an expectation that
the domestic legal orders of participating states will turn these norms
into law, but the norms also simultaneously serve as the source of
private regulation for the internal and external constitutions of
enterprises. The object is not so much to reassert the authority of any
particular state, but rather to aggregate public power at the
international level and develop norms within that aggregation to be
applied to the emerging governance aggregations of private power
represented by the community of multinational corporations. The
resulting polycentric systems would both preserve the superiority of
state power within their territories and impose global standards on
consenting communities of private actors. The Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises system represents one attempt to
88. On power asymmetries between large multinational corporations and small states,
see, for example, Gary Chartier, Sweatshops, Labor Rights, and Competitive Advantage,
10 OR. REv. INT'L L. 149, 175 (2008).
89. See, e.g., Larry Cati Backer, God(s) Over Constitutions:Internationaland Religious
TransnationalConstitutionalism in the 21st Century, 27 MIss. C. L. REV. 11 (2007).
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operationalize such a system. The United Nations' Global Compact
more recently the9 Protect, Respect, Remedy Principles
project and
91
framework, represent another.9 2
1. The OECD CorporateGovernance System
The OECD 93 has elaborated a set of three constituting groups of
behavior norms, the Principles of Corp orate Governance,94 the
and the Guidelines on
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises,
Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises.96 Together, these
provide a comprehensive set of principles for the governance of economic
enterprises in the organization of their government and in the rules
limiting the range of their behaviors with other actors. The power of this
framework is evidenced by the willingness of other international
governance actors to use it. Thus, for example, the "World Bank
benchmarks the corporate governance framework and company

90. UN GLOBAL COMPACT, http://www.unglobalcompact.org (last visited Jan. 20, 2011).

91. See Larry CatA Backer, The United Nations'"Protect,Respect, and Remedy"Human
Rights Project: On Operationalizing a Global Framework for the Regulation of
Transnational Corporations,9 SANTA CLARA J. INT'L LAW (forthcoming 2010).
92. OECD, GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, supra note 31.
93. The OECD is an intergovernmental organization representing most developed
states. See About OECD, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/pages/
0,3417,en_36734052_3673410311_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2011). For a
discussion, see, for example, Larry CatA Backer, Rights and Accountability in

Development (RAID) v Das Air and Global Witness v Afrimex: Small Steps Towards an
Autonomous Transnational Legal System for the Regulation of Multinational
Corporations, 10 MELB. J. INT'L L. 258
(2009). http://www.oecd.org/pages/
0,3417,en_36734052_36734103_1_1_1_1_1,00.html
94. OECD, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 31.
95. OECD, GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES supra note 31. The
Guidelines were most recently revised in May 2011. The Guidelines provide voluntary
principles of business behavior covering virtually every aspect of the operations of an
economic enterprise. "Although many business codes of conduct are now available, the
Guidelines are the only multilaterally endorsed and comprehensive code that governments
are committed to promoting." OECD, POLICY BRIEF: THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (2001), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/
12/21/1903291.pdf. "In 2010, ten years after the last revision of the Guidelines, the 42
adhering governments agreed on the terms of reference for carrying out an update of the
Guidelines. The update aims to ensure the continued role of the Guidelines as a leading
international instrument for the promotion of responsible business conduct." Guidelines
for
Multinational
Enterprises:
About,
OECD
http://www.oecd.orglabout/
0,3347,en_2649_34889_1_11_1_1,00.html (last visited July 3, 2011).
96. OECD, GUIDELINES ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES
(2005), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/46/51/34803211.pdf.
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practices of countries against the OECD Principles as part of the
'Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes' initiative."07
The critical aspect of these normative constructs is their
independence from the state. Though the OECD principles are not
purely the product of the entities they purport to govern, neither are
they products of any one state.98 Like the U.N. Three Pillar Framework
discussed below, the OECD also recognizes both the autonomy and
binding nature of the social norm system (the substantive provisions of
which it seeks to enforce through its own provisions) over those of state
law systems in which corporations operate. More importantly, the
OECD system is built on the idea that stronger corporations have public
roles within states with weak governance law systems.99 The insights
from the OECD Risk Awareness Tool now better reveal their
governance implications,100 which are meant to substitute multinational
governance, with corporate self-governance in its relationship with
others, for law systems within territories in which the state is largely
marginal. This is meant to avoid the problem of a blind adherence to a
hierarchy-of-rule system that always posits the supremacy of law
systems even where the state is effectively absent. "Such contexts
attract marginal and illicit enterprises, which treat them as law-free
zones." 01 But the issues of public functions of private enterprises in
weak governance zones remains contentious even within the OECD.102
97. Financial Standards Foundation, Principles of Corporate Governance, ESTANDARDS
FORUM, http://www.estandardsforum.org/about standards/principles-of-corporate-governance
(last visited Jan. 20, 2011) ('Participation is voluntary. As of October 2007, ROSCs for 41
countries have been published on the World Bank website with the authorization of the
respective country. Only low- and middle-income countries and economies in transition have
been assessed").
98. "For over 35 years, these guidelines have occupied a unique space within the world
of corporate social responsibility. They are the only ones formally endorsed by
governments, 42 at last count. And they do bring together labor, civil society, and business
to create the broadest possible consensus behind them. This is truly the work of a global
policy network in action." Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Sec'y of State, Commemoration of
the 50th Anniversary of the OECD On Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (May 25,
2011), available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/05/164340.htm. See also
Backer, supranote 31.
99. OECD, RISK AWARENESS TOOL FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES IN WEAK

GOVERNANCE ZONES (2006), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/26/21/36885821.pdf
[hereinafter RISK AWARENESS TOOL].

100. The OECD Council explained that in such weak governance zones "governments,
international organisations and multinational enterprises can each draw on their
distinctive competences to contribute to the efforts of strengthening governance in such
zones." Id. at 5.
101. John G. Ruggie, U.N. Special Representative, Consultation on Operationalizing the
Framework for Business and Human Rights, Opening Remarks (October 5-6, 2009),
availableat http://www.business-humanrights.org/SpecialRepPortal
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2. The U.N. Protect, Respect, Remedy Framework
The U.N. Protect, Respect, Remedy Framework is made up of three
pillars: the state duty to protect against human rights abuses by third
parties, including businesses; the corporate responsibility to respect
human rights, which means to avoid infringing on the rights of others;
and greater access by victims to effective judicial and nonjudicial
remedies. The substantive values to be protected are those commonly
referred to as the International Bill of Human Rights. 103 The corporate
responsibility to protect is grounded in the presumption that
corporations are subject to two sets of obligations. The first are a set of
legal obligations, enforced by and owed to the states in whose territories
they operate or from which they acquire legal recognition. The second
are a set of obligations owed beyond the legal authority of states to the
stakeholders with and through whom corporations acquire form and
through which they operate.10 This double set of obligations reflects the
character of entities as both economic and social/political organizations.
Mr. John G. Ruggie, the United Nations Special Representative of
the Secretary-General on Business & Human rights, identified the key
conceptual challenges to the Three Pillar framework specifically, and
supranational governance of private actors generally. 05 The first issue
/Home/OHCHRConsultation-Geneva5-60ct2009.
102. RISK AWARENESS TOOL, supranote 99, at 31-33.

103. See United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Fact Sheet
No. 2 (Rev. 1), The International Bill of Human Rights (June 1996),
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet2Rev. len.pdf.www.ohchr.org/Doc
uments/Publications/FactSheet2Rev. len.pdfwww.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactS
heet2Rev. len.pdfwww.ohchr.orgfDocuments/Publications/FactSheet2Rev. len.pdfwww.ohc
hr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet2Rev. len.pdf.
104. In explaining this two-fold set of normative obligation, John Ruggie noted, "As a
well established and institutionalized social norm, the corporate responsibility to respect
exists independently of State duties and variations in national law. There may be
situations in which companies have additional responsibilities. But the responsibility to
respect is the baseline norm for all companies in all situations." Rep. on the Issue of
Human Rights and Transnational Corporations, Human Rights Council, 11th Sess., 48,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/11/13 (Apr. 22, 2009) (by John Ruggie), available at
http://www.rwi.uzh.ch/lehreforschung/alphabetischlkaufmann/archives/HSO9/vorlesungen/
Text-13.pdf. He emphasized this idea in subsequent online consultations. 'The corporate
responsibility to respect human rights constitutes a standard of expected conduct for all
business enterprises. It exists independently of States' abilities and/or willingness to fulfill
their human rights duties, and does not diminish those duties." Special Representative of
the U.N. Secretary-General for Business and Human Rights, The CorporateResponsibility
to Respect Human Rights, 12, (Jan. 31, 2011) (by John Ruggie), available at
http://www.srsgconsultation.org/index.php/main/discussion?discussion-id=8.
105. John Ruggie, U.N. Special Representative, Opening Remarks at the Office of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights Consultation - Geneva (Oct. 5, 2009), availableat
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touches on jurisdiction. Here the great difficulty is defining the scope of
the obligations to be imposed, formally and socially, on enterprises.
There is a great tension between the need for precision and certaintythe great foundation of law systems-and the reality that in practice all
activity is intimately interconnected-the foundation of systems of
social or customary norm systems.10 6 The second challenge focuses on
the legal and policy incoherence of domestic legal systems.107 Related to
incoherence is the problem of complexity. Together they suggest that
the state has been slow to coordinate its policies either with its
international obligations or within its own domestic legal orders, a point
driven home with an example from governance in South Africa. 0 8 If
multinational corporations are bound by a social norm system structure
beyond conventionally applicable law structures, as Mr. Ruggie
suggests, then such enterprises are bound to provide an adequate
mechanism for enforcing its norm obligations. 09 Autonomous systems
tend to provide for the vindication of rights and the management of
obligations undertaken thereby. That is also the case within private
social norm systems. This brings the last challenge of polycentric
systems, the restructuring of governance power that recognizes that the
most developed private entities may have superior public obligations to
those of developing states in which they operate, which is especially the
case with respect to remedies. 11 0

http://www.business-humanrights.org/Documents/Ruggie-speech-to-Geneva-consultationOct-2009.pdf.
106. Mr. Ruggie rejects legal formalism as the sole basis for the construction of the
social framework for business conduct. "Virtually all rights are relevant, though some may
be more so than others in particular circumstances. This fact needs to inform the policies
of states and companies alike." Id. at 2.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 2-3 ("Not long ago, the government of South Africa was confronted with a
startling instance of how serious this lack of policy coherence can be when investors from
Italy and Luxembourg took it to binding international arbitration under a bilateral
investment treaty. The investors claim that certain mining provisions of the Black
Economic Empowerment Act amount to expropriation, entitling them to compensation....
An official policy review explains that, among other reasons, 'the Executive had not been
fully apprised of all the possible consequences of BITs,' including for human rights.").
109. "In effect, this replicates the 'legalistic' approach I've just described: if it isn't
required by law, we don't need to do it. Companies thereby deny those who are adversely
affected by their activities an opportunity to resolve issues that may be readily
remediable." Id. at 3.
110. "The incidence of corporate-related human rights abuse is higher in countries with
weak governance institutions: local laws either do not exist or are not enforced, even
where the country in question may have ratified all the relevant international human
rights conventions. The worst cases occur amid armed conflict over the control of territory
or of the government itself." Id.
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The point suggests a convergence in governance capacitydeveloped states and the largest multinational corporations are closer in
form and operation than either are to less-developed states and smaller
corporations. Larger corporations and developed states are then more
likely to look to each other for governance harmonization than either
would look to developing states or smaller corporations. 1 1 That, in turn,
suggests a fundamental reorientation of governance chains grounded in
a functional abandonment of the public-private distinction. In place of
this dual system, another is emerging, one in which the comparative
law project will need to bridge gaps between public law-based state
systems and private social norm-based systems. If at least the most
advanced multinational enterprises are the functional equivalent of
states, then they ought to undertake burdens commensurate with their
power and effects.
The consequences may be profound for the
relationship between state-based law systems and transnational norm
systems (and the related social license construct). The public obligations
of private enterprises cannot be based on the law systems of statesthat would suggest an unnatural extension of state power to nonstate
actors. Instead, that public authority must be sourced within the norm
system that serves as the other foundation of corporate governance
power. The issue of corporate public power, then, both reflects and
acknowledges the limits of law and the autonomy of norm systems that
exist in parallel but separate spheres. The tensions in those
relationships must be mediated, especially where the private power can
no longer be brought under the control of any single law system. This is
most profoundly felt in related supranational public regulatory efforts,
for example in efforts to specify the governance power of corporations in
so-called weak governance zones.113

C. The CorporateGlobal Soft Law Constitution
The principles exemplified by the OECD governance projects, and
those like it that seek to elaborate a constitutional system of corporate
111. Consider the response of the Chair of the Financial Stability Forum to the criticism
"that it excluded developing or emerging economies." Enrique R. Carrasco, The Global
FinancialCrisis and the Financial Stability Forum: The Awakening and Transformation
of an International Body, 19 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 204 (2010).
Chairman Crockett's explanation for this lack of representation was that the FSF could be
more effective if it was 'homogenous."' Id.
112. Ruggie, supra note 105, at 3 (claiming companies are "only slowly discovering that
in many situations meeting legal requirements alone may fall short of the universal
expectation that they operate with respect for human rights--especially, but not only,
where laws are inadequate or not enforced.").
113. See, e.g., RISK AWARENEss TOOL, supranote 99.
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governance and behavior, start from a presumption of universal values
as a basis for the organization of corporations and their governance
structures. In that context, the state retains an important role, but not
the principal regulatory role. Private governance, in its constituting
aspects, looks to supranational entities for its sources; it is not
dependent on the constitutional traditions or the coercive power of
states. This brings the discussion to its core-the centrality of notions of
polycentricity in the construction of public-private governance systems.
Globalization has made single system techniques obsolete. The inability
of states to reach every actor that affects them or for private entities to
operate outside the limits of their social norms suggests that governance
systems must seek to harness both. 1 14 Incompatible systems, law and
norm, must effectively find a way to communicate and harmonize values
and relevance for their constituting communities, whether these are
citizens, consumers, employees, or investors.1 15
Indeed, it is now possible to speak of three new and distinct
constitutional phenomena.116 The first is the development of principles
of transnational corporate 11constitutionalism
that mimic those of state7
centered constitutionalism.
This sees the company as something distinct from the
contracting partners' original compact but seeks to show
that, in coming together and using the corporate tool,
the contractors have created an instrument that has a
real identity separate from, and quite distinct from, the
original contracting partners. The company, if you like,
"floats free" from its founders and becomes a separate
person with its own interests. Inherent in this approach

114. Id. at 4.

115. See Elinor Ostrom, Vulnerability and Polycentric Governance Systems, IDHP
UPDATE, no. 3, 2001, available at http://www.ihdp.uni-bonn.de/html/publications/
update/ihdpupdateOl03.html; Larry CatA Backer, Governance Without Government: A
Preliminary Overview, LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY (June 16, 2009),
http://Icbackerblog.blogspot.com/2009/06/governance-without-government.html.
116. See supranotes 60-92 and accompanying text. See also Backer, supra note 31.

117. See, e.g., Stephen Bottomley, From Contractrualism to Constitutionalism: A
Framework for Corporate Governance, 19 SYDNEY L. REV. 277, 291 (1997) ("Companies are

political institutions not simply because they are players in social power relations, but
because they themselves are systems in which power and authority, rights
obligations, duties and expectations, benefits and disadvantages, are allocated
exercised, whether actively or passively, collectively or individually. Each company
body politic, a governance system.").

also
and
and
is a
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is a distinction between the notion of the origins of a
company and its dynamic existence after foundation. 118
The second is the elaboration of an institutional framework for
transnational corporate constitutionalism, which posits both an
autonomous community of corporations and the institutional
mechanisms for the development of rules for their organization and
behavior.1 19 The internal constitutions of corporations are increasingly
sourced from norms whose origins are developed outside the state.
Those norms are reflected in both the internal corporate governance of
these actors and their external relations with other state and nonstate
actors. The external constitution of corporations is increasingly tied to
supranational systems as corporations become the subjects of an
international regulatory community existing alongside that of managing
states.
The most important element is the least well expressed-the
detachment of corporate governance from the state with a corresponding
attachment to a supra-national level of governance. Whatever the
source of constitutional principles-that source is no longer centered on
or dependent on the state for its articulation or control. In order to avoid
the power of the state, nonstate systems seeking functional autonomy
must adapt the models or practices of supranational public
organization. And the most important lesson is strength in numbers, an
institutionalization of intermeshing. These notions also touch on
characterization. Nonstate systems are viewed as deficient precisely
because they are not states and cannot regulate in the manner of
states-that is, through law. The assumption underlying this conceptual
framework is ideological-positing a hierarchy of governance within
which positive law (starting with the higher law of the constitution) sits
at the apex, and below which other forms of rule systems reside in a
state of dependency. Thus the reference to the internal constitution of
corporations as soft law is at its foundation not descriptive but
normative and relational-asserting the position of these frameworks as
less legitimate because they are not products of a state and are
subordinate to the law systems of whatever states with which these
entities come into contact. They are criticized because they are not

118. JANET DINE, THE GOVERNANCE OF CORPORATE GRouPs 26 (2000).

119. "Neo-liberalism and its institutional partner, the investment rules regime, aim to
institutionalize a model of constitutional government intended primarily to facilitate the
free flow of goods, services, capital and persons unimpeded across the borders of national
states." DAVID SCHNEIDERMAN, CONSTITUTIONALIZING EcONOMIC GLOBALIZATION:
INVESTMENT RULES AND DEMOCRACY'S PROMISE 2 (2008).

780

INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 18:2

law. 12 0 But that is precisely the point. These enactments are meant to
serve as the law of the governance community for which it is made. It is
not a product of the state or dependent on the state apparatus as either
source or enforcer. Changing the frame of reference also changes the
nature of these enactments-voluntary codes are not binding on states
or corporations through the organs of state enforcement but are binding
within the governance systems of the corporations themselves through
the same mechanism that makes state law systems work-that is,
through the consent of the governed.
Governance polycentricity of this kind results in part from fears of
erosions of state power either to supranational public collectives or
private governance collectives. The great gatekeeper totem is law-as
long as states retain a monopoly of law, and defend the position of law
as the superior form of governance, states permit some room for
governance in those areas where state power may not comfortably
reach. To extend the law power of multistate collectives or private
governance collectives is viewed as a threat and aggressively opposed.' 2 '
As such, when measured against the well-ordered and stable
institutional framework of the state, the power of corporate selfgovernance, as both a matter of internal organization, and the ordering
of its relationships among all actors contributing to its enterprise,
appears unstable, unenforceable, and open-ended. Yet, within the
governance universe each represents, the systems appear both
autonomous and binding-not as law (understood as proceeding from
states) but as governance (proceeding from the consent of the governed
organized in behavior regulating groups).
Taken together, the elements of nonstate regulatory systems become
clear. Such systems are dependent on the creation of entities-either a
singular aggregation (like a corporation) or a group of actors-that can
distinguish themselves from others along functional lines. This group
acquires substance by institutionalizing its connections and vesting that
institutional construct with regulatory authority to which each member
120. See Mark B. Baker, Tightening the Toothless Vise: Codes of Conduct and the
American MultinationalEnterprise,20 WIS. INT'L L.J. 89 (2001); Sean D. Murphy, Taking

Multinational CorporateCodes of Conduct to the Next Level, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
389 (2005); Beth Stephens, The Amorality of Profit: Transnational Corporations and
Human Rights, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 45, 78-81 (2002).
121. The alternative, and less well-accepted response, at least within the community of
public actors, is based on a willingness to acknowledge the public power of these private
institutions and to bring them within the regulatory framework that binds other public

actors. See Larry CatA Backer, Multinational Corporations, Transnational Law: The
United Nation'sNorms on the Responsibilitiesof TransnationalCorporationsas Harbinger
of Corporate Responsibility in International Law, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 287
(2006).
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agrees to be bound. Members are rewarded for compliance by conferral
of the benefits of membership in the governance community and by
maintaining group cohesion. They may be disciplined through the power
to exclude them from the group, and therefore also exclude them from

participation in the construction of a regulatory framework within
which the collective will operate. Lastly, the group acquires an authority
to interpret and apply its regulatory framework against its members.
Now constituted as an autonomous, self-conscious entity with structure
and internal coherence within the scope of the purposes for which it was
created, it can communicate with other similar entities-states, other
122
regulatory public organs, and private entities.
To the extent its
membership is powerfully constituted, it can extend its reach well
beyond its members; its activities providing the basic material for the
creation of custom and practice norms among all similarly situated
entities. It exists apart and well within a dynamic cluster of public and
private regulatory communities, each controlling its members within
the limited scope of their respective power.

123

This model provides substantial insights into the self-organization
of nonstate actors within governance systems that are narrowly tailored
to (i.e., functionally differentiated for the attainment of) the objectives
for which stakeholders come together. This form of governance may echo
those commonly associated with law states-treaty, contract, soft law
and the like. But these expressions of the form of governance are not
meant to invoke the basic sources of public power. Instead they derive
authority from the community itself and within that group are binding
as the "law-system" of the governance community. More importantly,
such autonomous self-constitution permits a more orderly interaction
with other systems of governance, not the least of which is the state
itself. But interaction need not mean subordination within the domestic
legal orders of one or another state. This template provides a
legitimating conceptual basis for the autonomy of governance systems
that are not derived from and subordinate to state power. So
constituted, it is a powerful tool for structuring governance that cannot
be grounded in the traditional forms, tools, assumptions, and
frameworks of state-law systems. And thus it is possible to discern an
unintended consequence of this development-the potentially
122. Jean-Philippe Robe, Multinational Enterprises: The Constitution of a Pluralistic
Legal Order, in GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE, supranote 41, at 45, 45-47, 52-56.
123. For states, this is marked by the limits of their territory; for functionally
differentiated nonstate regulators, it is marked by the description of the function the
community serves. See, e.g., Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther Teubner, Regime-

Collisions:The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentationof Global Law, 25 MICH.
J. INT'L L. 999, 1019-45 (2004).
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significant importance of these forms of governance to the construction
of public governance systems of states. It is to that possibility, and the
consequences of that possibility, that this article turns next.
II. CORPORATE CONSTITUTIONALISM WITHIN A METAGOVERNANCE
FRAMEWORK

While it is useful to begin to grasp the scope, nature, and character
of nonstate regulatory systems, like those of multinational corporations
(and related enterprises), it is hardly enough. These regulatory systems,
closed and coherent, do not exist in a vacuum, nor are their development
and operations ignored by other important regulatory systems. A
networked polycentricity is at the heart of key public efforts to develop
governance systems for multinational corporations that are not
embedded within the law systems of states. These public efforts serve
the state as well, by connecting the construction of these nonstate
autonomous self-constituting systems to states. Yet in making these
systemic connections, the character of domestic legal orders also
changes. It follows that, in order to understand the importance of these
nonstate systems, it is necessary to explore their operations at the
borders of their jurisdiction, and in the way in which they interlink with
other regulatory actors. It is critical to examine the way in which these
emerging models of private governance can be turned on the state itself.
If private entities can assert governance functions and if states engage
in markets like private participants, do the patterns and approaches to
private governance have application to the state system at the
supranational level?
States have not been idle in the face of the transformation of power
and governance frameworks. Some have begun to exhibit a willingness
to conduct their affairs through participation in global economic
markets rather than solely through the traditional methods of
legislation. With the rise of state-owned enterprises that mimic global
multinational enterprises and large sovereign wealth funds that
emulate private global investment vehicles, it is possible to conceive of
states as market participants on a global scale. 24 At the same time,
states continue to project their regulatory authority against the
worldwide operations of enterprises operating within their territories,125
124. See Larry CatA Backer, Sovereign Investing in Times of Crisis: Global Regulation of
Sovereign Wealth Funds, State Owned Enterprises, and the Chinese Experience, 19
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3 (2010).
125. On the efforts to use extraterritoriality principles to regulate multinational
enterprises from home or host states, see, for example, Anne-Marey Burley, The Alien Tort

Statute and the JudiciaryAct of 1789: A Badge of Honor, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 461 (1989);
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or with effects within their territories, for example in the United States
under the Alien Tort Claims Act. 126
For all of its dynamic elements, these changes suggest a messy
business. States are still strong, in the conventional sense, and some
retain the disposition to be aggressive to the extent of their ability to
control.127 In some respects, the state may effectively operate through
private enterprises, with public governance reducing itself to little more
than a privatized expression of public law. 128 Though some states have
effectively ceased to exist,129 others exist as equals or inferiors in power
to smaller states, transnational corporations, and civil society actors. 130
Moreover, not all states are facing changes in the nature of their power
and the exercise of their sovereignty vis-A-vis other states and nonstate
actors in the same way. Neither the development of governance without
government nor government without a state is happening in singleminded linear fashion. Many nonstate actors continue to operate within
the law systems of states that can effectively control them, but an
increasing number do not. The ease of movement of capital and the
integrity and uniformity of global standards for governance, coupled
with growing expectations of behavior among states, makes existence
beyond the power of a state increasingly feasible. And feasibility
nurtured into fact produces a necessary turn to governance. The
relationships among these actors change both in context and over time.
But what makes for the greatest part of the mess is that all of these
actors are simultaneously acting against each other, over and over again
in contexts that change over place and time.
This messiness does not so much suggest a reactionary putsch by
states as it heralds a revaluation of state power. This movement is not
unconsciously pursued. Again, Mr. Sarkozy's populist musings at the
World Economic Forum in Davos are useful. To preserve the state at the
apex of global regulatory hierarchies, one must incorporate one's rivals
within a larger system in which power might be shared along new lines
and potentially to the advantage of the old class of hierarchs. For that
Robert K. Rasmussen, A New Approach to TransnationalInsolvencies, 19 MICH. J.INT'L L.
1 (1997).
126. Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006); see also Burley, supra note 125.
127. See, e.g., Reza Dibadj, Panglossian Transnationalism, 44 STAN. J. INT'L L. 253
(2008).
128. See, e.g., Teubner, supra note 44.
129. Peter T. Leeson & Claudia R. Williamson, Anarchy and Development: An
Application of the Theory of Second Best, 2 LAW & DEv. REv. 75 (2009); Ken Menkhaus,

Governance Without Government in Somalia: Spoilers, State Building, and the Politics of
Coping, 31 INT'L SECURITY 74 (2006).

130. See Larry Cata Backer, Economic Globalization Ascendant: Four Perspectives on
the Emerging Ideology of the State in the New Global Order, 17 LA RAZA L.J. 141 (2006).
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purpose, Mr. Sarkozy offers his audience something quite startling-not
the reconstituted empire of the state, but a new protean singularity, a
union of strong states acting collectively with powerful regulatory
nonstate actors . . . the
G-20!131 This lightly institutionalized
intergovernmental construct "foreshadows the planetary governance of
the 21st century. It symbolises the return32of politics whose legitimacy
was denied by unregulated globalisation."1
The
G-20 is arguably a large and wobbly intergovernmental
construct and hardly the stuff of governance. The
G-20 is an
intergovernmental amalgamation of economic regulatory authorities
from the G-20 states.1 33 Its mandate has been appropriately vague and
134
comfortably intergovernmental, suggesting no regulatory power.
Indeed, the G-20 takes pains to distinguish itself as a conclave of states
without supranational institutional aspirations.13 5 Yet, this is deceiving.
First, the G-20 has acknowledged its role as a vehicle through which its
members might work through regulatory matters for transposition
within their respective national legal orders through a commitment to
deepen cooperation to improve the regulation, supervision and the
But one aspect of
overall functioning of the world's financial markets.
its operations merits closer study. The FSB, which emerged newly
institutionalized and reconstituted in September 2009 from its
predecessor, the Financial Stability Forum, suggests a new form of
governance mechanism above the state, but one that might significantly
constrain the regulatory scope of private transnational actors. This
section first suggests the contours of the FSB as both coherent and
regulatory. It then considers the regulatory impact of the FSB
governance template on nonstate public-private governance.

131. Sarkozy Speech, supra note 22, at 4.
132. Id.
133. The "Group of Twenty (G-20) Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors was
established in 1999 to bring together systemically important industrialized and
developing economies to discuss key issues in the global economy. The inaugural meeting
of the G-20 took place in Berlin, on December 15-16, 1999, hosted by German and
Canadian finance ministers." What is the G-20, G-20, http://www.g20.org/
aboutwhat is-g20.aspx.
134. "The G-20 is the premier forum . . . that promotes open and constructive discussion
between industrial and emerging-market countries on key issues related to global
economic stability. By contributing to the strengthening of the international financial
architecture and providing opportunities for dialogue on national policies, international
co-operation, and international financial institutions, the G-20 helps to support growth
and development across the globe." Id.
135. "Unlike international institutions such as [OECD], IMF or World Bank, the G-20
(like the G-7) has no permanent staff of its own." Id.
136. See id.
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A. The FinancialStability Board System
The FSB is the institutionalized, administratively
more
bureaucratized, and formally organized vessel for the coordination of a
large network of national and supranational regulatory actors that
emerged out of the Financial Stability Forum (FSF).13 7 By 2008, this
anemic form of intergovernmentalism created as an appendage of the G7 (now reconstituted as the G-20) was proving inadequate as a response
to the apparent need to show a greater readiness to coordinate
responses to the economic crisis, and especially the need to produce
something tangible to demonstrate public sector responses. 13 8 For that
purpose, the FSF was reconstituted as the FSB in 2009.139 "In a world
lacking a global financial regulator, the FSF's function is to promote the
development and adoption of standards and codes that, when adopted
into domestic regulatory frameworks, will reduce vulnerabilities in the
international financial system that may lead to global crises." 14 0
The FSB has acquired an institutional form that is similar, in many
ways, to those of many international organizations with a strong
intergovernmental character. 14 1 Its charter does not create any legal
rights or obligations, or produce, formally, a fully constituted legal
personality. 14 2 But for the purposes of its work, that may make little
difference. 143 Thus, as constituted, the FSB fulfills three broad

137. For an excellent discussion of the FSF on the eve of its transformation, see
Carrasco, supra note 111.
138. Carrasco argues that the 'TSFs work prior to the current crisis was
underwhelming." Id. at 207. But ironically enough, its most important work might become
a key ingredient of the work of the new FSB. "The most ambitious project was the
adoption of a Compendium of Standards, intended to harmonize and make many sets of
standards published by standard setting bodies more workable." Id. However, with the
start of the crisis in 2007, the FSF produced a series of reports that suggested in broad
outline, an approach to structural reform for the amelioration of the crisis. Id. at 208-14.
139. The FSB was created in April 2009, but its charter became effective only at the
conclusion of the G-20 meeting on September 25, 2009. Financial Stability Board Charter
art. 17 [hereinafter FSB Charter], available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/
publicationslr_090925d.pdf.
140. Carrasco, supra note 111, at 205.
141. The FSB operates through four administrative organs: the Plenary, the Steering
Committee, the Chair, and the Secretariat. See FSB Charter, supra note 139, arts. 6-7, 11,
13-15.
142. Id. art. 16.
143. The FSB has already moved quickly to deepen its informal organizational
structure. FSB, OVERVIEW OF PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING THE LONDON SUMMIT
RECOMMENDATIONS

FOR

STRENGTHENING

FINANCIAL

STABILITY:

REPORT

FINANCIAL
STABILITY
BOARD TO
G20 LEADERS
1
(2009),
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r-090925a.pdf.

OF

available

THE
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purposes. 144 The first is to serve as a nexus point for the large group of
economic regulatory agencies that exist at the national and
international level. The second is to generate information and data with
respect to problems and policy approaches to national action. The third
is to generate guidelines and other proto-regulation that could then
serve as a legislative template for transposition into national legal
orders. The FSB also serves as the generator of global customary
standards to be followed by the community of states generally, 145 and
specifically as a governance clearinghouse for states and other public
organizations, to promote harmonization of governance creation and
transposition. 146

The FSB mandate further suggests a role as a collaborative statebased governance body coordinating the governance activities of
nonstate governance bodies. It is tasked with a coordinating role for
governance efforts of private and hybrid transnational regulators,
principally the work of standard setting bodies (SSBs), 14 7 including
coordinating regulatory communication between states and private
governance bodies. 148 It is also to "support contingency planning for
cross border crisis management, particularly with respect to
systemically important firms." 14 9 These efforts, targeting so-called "too
big to fail" institutions, are collaborative at both the transnational1 5 0
and national levels. 15 1 The FSB also manages the supervisory
intergovernmental entities, management entities, and the supervisory
colleges. 152
144. FSB Charter, supra note 139, art. 2; see also G20, DECLARATION ON FURTHER
1 (2009),
available at
FINANCIAL SYSTEM
STEPS To STRENGTHEN THE
http://www.g20.org/documents/fin-deps-fin-reg-annex_020409 -_1615_final.pdf.
145. The understanding, of course, is that collective action by the G-20 will have a
strong ripple effect on the regulatory approaches of nonG-20 states. On the theoretical
underpinnings of the presumptions that underlie this framework for super-state-led
globalization, see Backer, supranote 130.
146. See FSB Charter, supra note 139, art. 2(1)(b)-(d).
147. Id. art. 2(1)(e).
148. Id. art. 2(2).
149. Id. art 2(1)(g).
150. See FSB ET AL., GUIDANCE TO ASSESS THE SYSTEMIC IMPORTANCE OF FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS, MARKETS AND INSTRUMENTS: INITIAL CONSIDERATIONS (2009), available at
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_091107c.pdf.
151. See Press Release, FSB, FSB Welcomes US Proposals for Reducing Moral Hazard
Risks (Jan. 22, 2010), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/press/
pr_100122.pdf.
152. The FSB is to "set guidelines for and support the establishment of supervisory colleges."
FSB Charter, supra note 139, art. 2(1)(f; see also Press Release, FSB, Statement of Mario
Draghi Chairman of the Financial Stability Board to the International Monetary and Financial
Committee (Oct. 11, 2008), available at httpJ/www.financialstabilityboard.org/press/
st101009.pdf. Supervisory colleges have now been established for more than thirty large
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Significant evidence of the potential influence of this organization
can be gleaned from the three reports produced for the 2009 Pittsburgh
G-20 meeting. The first focused on measures for improving financial
regulation. 1 53 By June 2010, the FSB was able to release an interim
report. 15 4 The second report more strongly suggested a connection
between public and private transnational governance.1 55 The issue of
transnational regulatory standards for compensation issues was taken
up in more detail in the third report. 156 This report related specific
proposals on compensation governance, structure, and disclosure to
strengthen adherence to the FSB Principles for Sound Compensation
Practices, issued in April 2009.157 The FSB followed this with a March
2010 assessment of the transposition of these standards by state and
nonstate economic actors. 158

complex financial institutions identified by the FSB as needing college arrangements. UNITED
STATES, CHAIR OF THE PITTSBURGH G20 SUMMIT, PROGRESS REPORT ON THE ACTIONS TO
PROMOTE
FINANCIAL
REGUIATORY
REFORM
2
(2009),
available
at
http://www.g20.org/Documents/pittsburgh_progress-report_250909.pdf.
These
supervisory
colleges are meant to coordinate work among agencies modeled on the European concept of
coordinating committees and the U.S. process for supervisory cooperation across its state-based
regulation system but apply to global enterprises, especially in regulated industries (e.g.,
insurance). See, e.g., INT'L ASS'N OF INS. SUPERVISORS, GUIDANCE PAPER ON THE USE OF
SUPERVISORY
COLLEGES
IN
GRoUP-WIDE
SUPERVISION
(2009),
available at
http://www.iaisweb.org/view/elementhrefcfm?src=1/8138.pdf.http://www.aciforex.com/docs/ma
rkettopics/20090427FSB.pdf.
153. See FSB, IMPROVING FINANCIAL REGULATION (2009) (identifying nine areas of
governance objectives), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/
r_090925b.pdf.
154. FSB, REDUCING THE MORAL HAZARD CAUSED BY SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (2010), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org
publications/r_100627b.pdf.
155. See FSB, supra note 143.
156. See FSB, FSB PRINCIPLES FOR SOUND COMPENSATION PRACTICES: IMPLEMENTATION
at
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org
STANDARDS
(2009),
available
publications/r_090925c.pdf.
157. Id.; see also FIN. STABILITY FORUM, FSF PRINCIPLES FOR SOUND COMPENSATION
PRACTICES 1 (2009) ('The FSF Principles for Sound Compensation Practices are intended
to apply to significant financial institutions, but they are especially critical for large,
systemically important firms."), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/
publications/r_0904b.pdf.
158. See Press Release, FSB, FSB Assess Progress on Reforming Compensation
Structures (March 30, 2010), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/press/
pr_100330a.pdf. See also the report itself, FSB, THEMATIC REVIEW ON COMPENSATION

(2010), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_100330a.pdf.
The focus on social norms-what the report termed industry practice-was also extensive
and suggested a need to blend a harmonized public law approach effectuated within all
participating states with the development of a common framework for industry practice.
See id. at 14-16.
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Taken together, the emerging FSB construct suggests a new and
curious form of transnational governance. It is hierarchical-designed to
privilege the role of the state in its operation. This is particularly
apparent in its emphasis on devising methods of taming autonomous
private global economic actors through state-based or supranational
regulation. 159 But the governance apparatus is not controlled
exclusively by states, nor directed solely at public governance. At its
core, the FSB framework is cooperative, public, and supranational:
states and nonstate regulatory actors play a critical but secondary role.
The FSB structure acknowledges the regulatory role of private
transnational actors, mostly in the form of SSBs, yet also acknowledges
the power of large private entities to act autonomously. Indeed, the
focus on the disruptive power of the largest of these enterprises (at least
in terms of global economic governance) suggests both an
acknowledgement of their autonomy and an effort to subordinate them
to public governance structures beyond the state. 160
The reliance on collaborative soft law instruments-principally in
the form of standards and principles developed in collaboration with a
complex set of international actors-also suggests a governance
structure in which implementation is devolved downward. States are
expected to transpose evolving governance frameworks within their
domestic legal orders, whether or not they participated directly in their
development. 16 1 Transnational soft law developed within the FSB
framework becomes a gateway to hard law that is crammed down on
nonparticipating jurisdictions through the application of pressure from
the G-20 member states. 162 In earlier contexts, this fear of cram down
generated some resistance of developing states to coordinate the work of
SSBs with transnational actors like the WTO.1 63
Private economic actors are involved as well. It is assumed that they
are to some extent responsible for the transposition of these norms into

159. UNITED STATES, CHAIR OF THE PITTSBURGH G20 SUMMIT, supra note 152, at 10
('The objective is to ensure that all systemically- important institutions, markets and
instruments are subject to an appropriate degree of oversight and regulation.").
160. FSB, OVERVIEW OF PROGRESS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE G20
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STRENGTHENING FINANCIAL STABILITY 9 (2010), available at
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r100627c.pdf.
161. FSB, PROGRESS SINCE THE PITTSBURGH SUMMIT IN IMPLEMENTING THE G20
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STRENGTHENING FINANCIAL STABILITY 10 (2009), available at
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_091107a.pdf.
162. FSB, FSB FRAMEWORK FOR STRENGTHENING ADHERENCE TO INTERNATIONAL
STANDARDS 2 (2010), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/
r_100109a.pdf; Andrew Lang & Joanne Scott, The Hidden World of WTO Governance, 20
EUR. J. INT'L L. 575, 580 (2009).
163. See, e.g., Lang & Scott, supra note 162.
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their operations in a way that mimics the expectation that states would
do the same through the transposition of standards into their domestic
legal orders. Such transposition is meant to follow from the regulatory
efforts of supranational corporate regulatory bodies, like the OECD,
which serve as the focal point of corporate soft law generation. 164
Indeed, the supervisory college mechanism can be understood as
representing both an acknowledgement of the regulatory authority of
large private global actors, and an effort to harmonize the systems of
their operations to patterns of public supranational organizations in the
public sector. 16 5
Yet, the FSB framework is not without its structural weaknesses.
Among the greatest of them are what corporate lawyers might refer to
as "path dependence" and what organizational theorists might describe
as intellectual hazard. Path dependence suggests the power of
institutional inertia to create its own set of normative values and
priorities that are then served by structures of law and social norms.166
The FSB would certainly be a prisoner of path dependence but of a more
complex form. Polycentricity at the heart of the FSB structure would
aggregate path dependent systems as they both seek to converge and to
preserve the inherent characteristics that make them different. The
FSB would have to carefully navigate between a functional (and
perhaps formal) project of harmonizing behavior rules and the need to
avoid using the FSB structure as a thinly disguised effort to tame and
subordinate nonstate governance structures within the state system, or
vice versa. Failure could lead to irrelevance, as states and nonstate
governance actors would abandon substantial commitment to its
harmonizing project.
If path dependency suggests the rationalization of inertia as an
institutional device, the concept of intellectual hazard suggests the
related danger of conceptual and communicative failure. "Intellectual
hazard . . . . is the tendency of behavioral biases to interfere with

164. This initiative "responds to a call by G20 Leaders at the April 2009 London Summit
and complements initiatives by the Global Forum and OECD to promote adherence to
international standards in the tax area, and by FATF for standards concerning antimoney laundering and combating the financing of terrorism." FSB, supra note 162, at 2-3.
165. See, e.g., INT'L Ass'N OF INS. SuPERvIsORS, supra note 152, 1 38 (explaining the
rationale of colleges within the insurance industry).
166. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate
Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127 (1999). Bebchuk and Roe distinguish
between structural and rule driven path dependence. The former "is structure driven ...
the ways in which initial ownership structures in an economy directly influence
subsequent ownership structures." Id. at 137. The latter is rules based. These rule
structures "can shape choices between ownership structures that have and do not have a
controlling shareholder." Id.
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accurate thought and analysis within complex organizations [and]
impairs the acquisition, analysis, communication, and implementation
of information within an organization and [its] communication between
an organization and external parties." 16 7 With respect to endeavors like
the FSB, Geoffrey Miller and Gerald Rosenfeld suggest the difficulty of
intellectual hazard bias as inherent in the perspectives of the
individuals that staff the FSB and the focus of the organization in terms
of the way it comes to understand its objectives.16 8 The FSB as a nexus
point for governance, then, is also a point of its greatest weakness, if
communication is strategic and limited by the conceptual blinkers that
drive the entities whose governance power the FSB seeks to coordinate.
In a sense, the greatest danger posed for FSB systems is built into the
complexity of the system itself-failures of policy and institutional
cultural coherence, failures of communication. But this is a danger that
suggests the development of the institutional autonomy of the
enterprise, its complexity and coherence.
In summary, the FSB suggests an autonomous governmental
structure and mandates a coherent scope of authority. It exercises
regulatory authority, and a strong power to interpret, but a limited
authority to enforce. The aggregate of this institutionalization,
apparatus building and governance framework may be the organization
of a supranational entity that is meant to serve as a clearinghouse for
legislation and as a forum for the harmonization and coordination of
national measures. This sort of polycentric transfer grounded in
coordination, consultation, and the development of customary
standards, hardened into the law and social norm systems of public and
private governance entities has become a powerful force at the
international level and is unlikely to disappear. 16 9 The value to national
167. Geoffrey P. Miller & Gerald Rosenfeld, Intellectual Hazard: How ConceptualBiases
in Complex Organizations Contributed to the Crisis of 2008, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
807, 808 (2010).
168. "Experience suggests that the problem of intellectual hazard will not be effectively
addressed if the personnel in the agency charged with identifying systemic threats to
financial stability are simply recycled regulators and central bankers. They will not bring
new ideas to the table; on the contrary, they will come as advocates for their agency's
positions and as defenders of their agency's turf and power. These people will suffer from
the forms of intellectual hazard we have already observed in regulators: asymmetry bias
embodied in fixed positions on policy questions, self-serving bias in the form of turf
protection and blame avoidance, and authoritarian bias in the form of deference to the
agencies that delegate personnel to these new monitoring bodies." Id. at 838.
169. See generally, ANDREW F. COOPER, TESTS OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: CANADIAN
DIPLOMACY AND UNITED NATIONS WORLD CONFERENCES (2004). Cooper notes that "[tihese

conferences shifted the focus of UN attention away from attempts to accommodate
globalisation through integrated economic interaction towards the promotion . . . of
universal social values and a demand for transparency and greater inclusion in
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governments is great-no longer solely accountable to their respective
electorates for the difficult economic and regulatory choices that they
might have to make, states could now lean on the work of this
organization as both the excuse for and the source of blame for
measures they might now appear to have to implement. A voluntary
organization provides another face to modern transnational
governance-a soft structure producing soft regulation that is then
absorbed at the national level. And perhaps more importantly, it
provides a nexus point for the organization and dissemination of
knowledge about economics and economic regulation that will seek to
control and serve as the foundation for discussions of these issues at a
supra- or transnational level of governance. The FSB is meant to set the
terms of discussion as well as to frame regulatory responses and private
behavioral norms. It is to produce standards that become law within
states and governance norms among private actors. It coordinates and
synthesizes. It does not legislate but produces law; it does not govern
but it produces standards. It does not administer, but it produces
information and monitors.
B. The Face of CooperativeNetworked Regulation
It is one thing to suggest a new public transnational governance
apparatus; it is quite another to find evidence of the character of that
governance. Still, a review of the FSB's agenda suggests the potential
contours of public governance at the supranational level. For that
purpose, it is useful to evaluate the foundational structure of the FSB's
cooperative governance in the production of integrated soft law
applicable to both public and private actors-states and economic
entities.170 To that end, it is useful to consider the complex framework
adopted for coordinating soft law standards for financial regulation, a
significant function of the FSB. It is also useful to consider the ways in
which such frameworks are then expected to be transposed into the
domestic legal orders of states and the operating systems of private
actors.
The coordination work of the FSB, through its elaboration and
implementation of a "Compendium of Standards," forms one of the
principal functions of the entity. 17 1 The object is to produce governance
international power structures and decision making processes." Id. at 1. This movement
"stands at the intersection between purpose and means in relation to the debate over
sovereignty." Id. at 122.
170. Details may be found in FSB, supranote 143.
171. See About the Compendium of Standards, FIN. STABILITY BD.,
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/cos/index.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2011).
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through soft law to "foster a race to the top, wherein encouragement
from peers motivates all countries and jurisdictions to raise their level
of adherence to international financial standards." 1 72 The compendium
consists of twelve key standards.173 These standards are understood as
both transnational and soft law, "representing minimum requirements
for good practice." 174 The standards are divided into three broad groups:
macroeconomic policy and data transparency, 175 institutional and
market infrastructure, 176 and financial regulation and supervision.1 7 7
These three broad groups of standard categories define a regulatory
matrix within which a large group of transnational regulators produce
172. FSB, supra note 162, at 1.
173. "The 12 standard areas highlighted here have been designated by the FSF as key
for sound financial systems and deserving of priority implementation depending on

country circumstances." Twelve Key Standards for Sound Financial Systems, FIN.
STABILITY BD., http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/cos/keystandards.htm (last visited
Jan. 21, 2011).
174. Id.
175. This grouping includes standards dealing with monetary and financial policy
transparency, fiscal transparency, and data dissemination. See IMF, CODE OF GOOD
PRACTICES ON TRANSPARENCY IN MONETARY AND FINANCIAL POLICIES (2000), available at
IMF,
CODE OF GOOD
http://www.imf.org/external/np/mae/mft/code/eng/code2e.pdf;
PRACTICES ON FISCAL TRANSPARENCY (2007), available at http://www.imf.orglexternal/np/
pp/2007/eng/051507c.pdf; IMF, GENERAL DATA DISSEMINATION SYSTEMS (1997), available
Special Data Dissemination
at http://dsbb.imf.org/images/pdfs/gdds-oct_2003.pdf;
Standard (SDDS), INT'L MONETARY FUND (1996), http://dsbb.imf.org/pages/sdds/
home.aspx (last visited Jan. 21, 2011).
176. This group consists of six identified standards: payment and settlement systems,
corporate governance, market incentives, insolvency, auditing, and accounting. COMM. ON
PAYMENT & SETTLEMENT SYS., CORE PRINCIPLES FOR SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT PAYMENT
SYSTEMS (2001), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss43.pdf; COMM. ON PAYMENT &
SETTLEMENT SYS., RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SECURITIES SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS (2001),
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss46.pdf; FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, FATF IX
SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS AGAINST TERRORIST FINANCING (2002), available at
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/8/17/34849466.pdf; FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, THE FORTY
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE (2002), available at
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/7/40/34849567.PDF; OECD, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE, supra note 31; WORLD BANK, PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR EFFECTIVE
available
at
(2001),
RIGHTS
SYSTEMS
AND
CREDITOR
INSOLVENCY
http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/ipg-eng.pdf; International Standards on Auditing (ISA),
IAASB (2002), http://www.ifac.org/LAASB/Pronouncements.php#Standards (last visited
Mar. 20, 2011); InternationalAccounting Standards()AS), INT'L ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
BD. (2002), http://www.iasb.org/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2011).
177. This group consists of three identified standards covering banking supervision, insurance,
and securities regulation. See BASIL COMM'N ON BANKING SUPERVISION, CORE PRINCIPLES FOR
EFFECTIVE BANKING SUPERVISION (2006), available at httpJ/www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl29.pd4 INT'L
ASS'N OF INS. SUPERVISORS, INSURANCE CORE PRINCIPLES (2003), available at
httpJ-/www.iaisweb.org/_tempInsurancecore-principles-and-methodology.pdf; INT'L ORG. OF
SEC. COMM'NS, OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF SECURYIES REGULATION (1998), available at

http//www.iosco.org/library/pubdocspdI7OSCOPD154.pdf.
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standards that conform to overall financial policy goals, and which are
aggregated through the FSB into a soft law codex applicable to its
member states and the entities operating within their collective borders.
The regulatory environment becomes clearer now. The FSB assumes
the role of a bridge institution. On the one hand, it is the coordinating
point for the aggregation of transnational soft law. On the other, the
FSB serves as a clearinghouse for the transposition of these norms down
to states (starting with the G-20) and private entities (starting with
transnational actors operating within the territories of the G-20).
Implementation of the regulatory standards cleared through the FSB is
to be accomplished through application of the usual elements of
transnational soft law governance, taking one of three forms: leadership
by example, undertaken by the member states of G-20/FSB; peer
reviews of member state
compliance through international
organizations tasked with a surveillance function; and the development
of surveillance capabilities, "a toolbox of measures to encourage
adherence to international cooperation and information exchange
standards by all countries and jurisdictions."178 This was emphasized
again in the summer of 2010 when the FSB announced the launching of
further "tool box measures" initiatives. 179
Leading by example puts a sloganeering face on an important
downstream managerial aspect of FSB operations. It represents a
commitment by the Member States of the FSB (the G-20) to implement
the standards adopted in the course of the horizontal cooperative efforts
180
of the FSB described above.
Upstream assessment through an IMFWorld Bank Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP), occurring
every five years, represents an upstream commitment to permit a
supranational entity authority to monitor compliance. This transfer of
authority upward and away from the state remains a sensitive issue,
especially to the extent it touches on traditional notions of state
181
sovereignty.
Upstream assessment is reinforced by the peer review

178. FSB, supra note 162, at 1.
179. Press Release, FSB, FSB Launches Initiative to Promote Global Adherence to
International Cooperation and Information Exchange Standards (Mar. 10, 2010),
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/press/pr_100310.pdf.
180. FSB, supra note 162, at 1.
181. A recent application of that sensitivity to transnational regulatory efforts was
evidenced at the Copenhagen Climate Conference at which the Chinese refused to agree to
external monitoring of self-imposed obligations on the grounds of interference with
sovereignty. See Jonathan Watts & John Vidal, China Blamed as Anger Mounts over
Climate Deal, THE GUARDIAN (London), Dec. 20, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/
environment/2009/decl20/china-blamed-copenhagen-climate-failure
('The deal, finally
hammered out early yesterday, had been expected to commit countries to deep cuts in
carbon emissions. In the end, it fell short of this goal after China fought hard against
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element of monitoring-a task which emphasizes the collaborative
nature of governance through the G-20/FSB framework.182 Lastly,
disclosure provides both benchmarking and a pool of data that has
internal effects-deepening discipline among member states-and
external effects, providing a behavioral template for use by other states.
But the toolbox is more than that. It also serves as a principal method
for enforcement. That enforcement approach mimics those developed for
private gjovernance systems-transparency, benchmarks, exposure, and
coercion.
The face of this new governance by example is already somewhat
evident.184 Spain, Italy, and Mexico are said to be the first countries
examined regarding the effectiveness of their implementation of the
rules to prevent future financial crises.185 The reviews are separate
from the FSB assessments that were started in 2010 on how countries
are implementing bonus and compensation rules.186 The FSB is also
conducting an initiative to encourage %lobal compliance with the
compendium of standards it is managing.
The launch in March 2010
of the FSB's initiative to promote global adherence to international
cooperation and exchange standards is illustrative of both the form of
governance and of its assumption that collectives of the largest states
and most influential corporations will develop a customary set of
practices to which the rest of the world's actors will eventually
subscribe.
Financial Sector Assessment Program appraisal is to occur
every five years and will be conducted under the authority of the IMFindeed, the FSAP has been a well-developed tool for that purpose over
the course of the last decade.189 Now thoroughly tested, its approach
will be globalized as applied to a broader range of actors. Ironically, the
forms of governance now part of the FSB's arsenal bear a resemblance
to the modalities of governance within the supply chain of large
multinational corporations.190 In this area, at least, there is a sort of
strong US pressure to submit to a regime of international monitoring. . . . 'For the
Chinese, this was our sovereignty and our national interest,' said Xie Zhenhua, head of
China's delegation.").
182. FSB, supra note 143, at 2.
183. Id. at 4.

184. See Joseph Heaven, Spain, Italy Said to Be First for FSB Peer Reviews (Updatel),
BLoOMBERG/BUSINESS WEEK (Jan. 20, 2010), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-0120/spain-italy-are-said-to-be-first-to-undergo-fsb-peer-reviews.html.
185. See FSB, supra note 162, at 9.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 9-10.
188. Press Release, FSB, supranote 179.

189. See The Financial Sector Assessment Program, IMF, http://www.imf.org/externall
NP/fsap/fsap.asp (last visited Mar. 20, 2010).
190. See Backer, supranote 20.
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convergence of operational form. On the issue of hierarchy of
governance power, the answers have yet to be written.
What emerges from the surprising self-revelation of the French
President is that the FSB, of course, is new and yet quite comfortably
embedded within emerging European public sector models of collective
governance. When formerly strong states weaken (in the case of Europe,
as a consequence of a long period of suicidal internal warfare in the
twentieth century), then union of some kind effectively reconstitutes
power and retains the illusion of sovereignty. More importantly,
welcoming former subordinates to the exclusive global power club can
serve as a way to retain power. Once subaltern states appear more than
willing to play (as long as a substantial line of states remain beneath
the new collective). Lastly, one must consider the effects of the
potentially severe strains on the power of state-centered positive law as
a regulatory mechanism. Absorption of new modalities of governance
beneath a superstructure of conventional law preserves the legal
superstructure in which "law," transposed into the domestic legal orders
of communities of states occupies the superior place. Yet, this construct
does not appear to advance the reactionary state resurrection project so
much as it highlights the powerful pull of governance from the state to
alternative centers of power.
This analysis brings one back to the point where this examination
started with Mr. Sarkozy's search for global governance in the state.
But it is a collaborative governance enterprise, the FSB, and not the
state, that now emerges as one face of the template offered by Mr.
Sarkozy for the coming system of global governance. There is something
old-fashioned about this governance model. The FSB model is grounded
on the willing participation of states, in the aggregate still the most
powerful actors on the globe, but the assertion of power has been recast
in completely modern form (and by modern I mean adopting the
patterns of multilateral governance forged after 1945). It is soft and
indirect. One no longer sees power marching through the streets of an
occupied place (though that happens now and again, though not so
much for governance purposes as for the management of populations
whose governments resist global governance norms). One understands
power in the form of principles, benchmarks, standards, objectives, and
rules. One feels the effects of these forms of governance through the
regulatory power of surveillance. The rules themselves are both
bureaucratized
and juridified. They are formulated through
191
mandarinates of experts
and interpreted through global networks of
191. Mandarinate means a cadre of functionaries that have been socialized to a single
purpose and who control a coherent set of values and objectives for the elaboration of
which they may be deployed by the authorities that ultimately control or manage them.

796

INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 18:2

judges. Rules are not imposed. They are transposed and adopted
through a long and amorphous process of consultation, construction,
adoption, and management. And they are complex, both in their own
field and together as a network of governance over economic and related
activities of states and others.
Soft law making, and governance through behavior-controlling
mechanisms-monitoring, evaluation, transparency, and the like-also
mask power. This aspect of power within soft regulatory approaches
permit states to avoid accountability, or more ironically put, to temper
the effects of direct democracy in the relationship of state apparatus to
sovereign populace. The FSB suggests a power-masking system in
which a supranational organ appears the source of governance, but in
which the states that are the objects of these regulatory proposals are
also the members of the entity doing the proposing and controlling the
nature and extent of its work. Within this closed circle of power
diffusion, everything is ultimately a product of the work of the
community of states that means to use the FSB as a sword and shield
for the effectuation of policies and regulatory approaches neither
politically palatable nor effective if left to the traditional forum of less
connected sovereign state governmental organs. In a world that is
grounded politically on theories of mass democracy, the new governance
suggested by Mr. Sarkozy and constructed through FSB, is grounded in
an aristocracy of experts. That reality colors Mr. Sarkozy's Davos efforts
192
at "populism" with both irony and perversity.
But soft law also proclaims the irrelevance of law systems. It is true
enough that soft law works poorly within the law systems of states and
the state-law system. Soft law is not enforceable, nor has it been
appropriately transposed within the state law system-the domestic
legal order of states. It is understood as a way station to the
achievement of a traditional hard law regime grounded in the state.19 3
Cf., Wells Klein and Marjorie Weiner, Vietnam, in GOVERNMENTS AND POLITICS OF
SOUTHEAST ASIA 315-420 (George McTurnan Kahin, ed., 1959) ("The Chinese Confucian
ideal on which the mandarinate was based represent[s] a single hierarchy of values that
the mandarins had a vested interest in maintaining." Id. at 378).
192. On the criticism of the speech as populist, and therefore easily dismissed as
political ravings, see, for example, 0. Gersemann & M. Hollstein, Sarkozy haut in Davos
kriiftig auf den Putz, WELT ONLINE (Jan. 27, 2010), http://www.welt.de/
politik/article6007512/Sarkozy-haut-in-Davos-kraeftig-auf-den-Putz.html; J6rg Eigendorf,
Davos - ein Gipfel der Ratlosigkeit und des Frusts, WELT ONLINE (Jan. 31, 2010),
http://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/article605000l/Davos-ein-Gipfel-der-Ratlosigkeit-und-desFrusts.html.
193. For a recent analysis, see Douglas W. Arner & Michael William Taylor, The Global
Financial Crisis and the Financial Stability Board: Hardening the Soft Law of
InternationalFinancialRegulation?, 32 U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 488 (2009).
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Yet that alien status (as "not law") also points to the autonomy of soft
law from both state and law. Soft law is soft as law, but it is hard among
those who embrace its norms. As part of the rules of its own normative
framework for governance, this "soft law" is "hard." If that is so, then
the language of that governance would not be that of the state, or of law
but more likely would adopt the language of consent and contract.19 4
That is the essence of legitimacy conceptions underlying recent
transnational regulatory efforts. 195
C. The FSB and TransnationalGovernance-Cooperationand Hierarchy
Within Global Polycentricity
The FSB suggests an important addition to the construction of the
framework of transnational global governance-one in which states,
international organizations, and nonstate actors construct an
increasingly elaborate system of self-government. This system is
polycentric, diffuse, and dynamic.1 96 Together, these formal and
informal authorities construct a layered, closed system of selfgovernance. 19 7 The FSB adds an important layer to this dynamic
complex of governance. It suggests another layer to the networked
governance that is a hallmark of globalization and of which
multinational corporations and international organizations play an
increasingly critical part.198 This section considers the regulatory
consequences for the FSB as a networked system within a greater
network of public and private governance.
194. Backer, supra note 12, at 26.
195. See, e.g., Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Human
Rights, Transnational Corporations, and Other Business Enterprises, Protect, Respect and

Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights, Hum. Rts. Council, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/8/5 (April 7, 2008), availableat http://198.170.85.29/Ruggie-report-7-Apr-2008.pdf.

196. James Rosenau, Governance, Order,and Change in World Politics,in GOVERNANCE
WITHOUT GOVERNMENT: ORDER AND CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS 1, 4 (James Rosenau &

Ernst-Otto Czempiel eds., 1992).
197. Friedrich Kratochwil & John Ruggie, InternationalOrganization:A State of the Art
on an Art of the State, 40 INT'L ORG. 753 (1986).
198. See, e.g., 1 MANUEL CASTELIS, THE INFORMATION AGE: ECONOMY, SOCIETY AND
CULTURE: THE RISE OF THE NETWORK SOCIETY (1996); JOHN H. DUNNING, ALLIANCE
CAPITALISM AND GLOBAL BUSINESS (1997); CHRISTOPHER FREEMAN, THE ECONOMICS OF
HOPE: ESSAYS ON TECHNICAL CHANGE, ECONOMIC GROWTH, AND THE ENVIRONMENT
(1992); Mark Ebers & Anna Grandori, The Forms, Costs, and Development Dynamics of
Inter-Organisational Networking, in THE FORMATION OF INTER-ORGANISATIONAL
NETWORKS 265 (Mark Ebers ed., 1999); THE EMBEDDED FIRM: ON THE SOCIOECONOMICS

OF INDUSTRIAL NETWORKS (Gernot Grabher ed., 1993); John Hagedoorn, Trends and

Patterns in Strategic Technology Partnering Since the Early Seventies, 11 REV. INDUS.
ORG. 601 (1996).
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In its specific organization, the FSB itself adds a level of governance
that is meant to draw in states. It is regulatory governance, developing
what appear to be soft law standards and guidelines that are then
treated as transposed into national legal orders as a sort of mandatory
requirement. 199 The result is a separation between political power and
accountability. This follows because the source of legislation is
transnational
and collective, rather than national, though
accountability remains national. It is possible, as a result, to
understand the rise of these soft and indirect regulatory systems as
grounded in the success of the model of the European Union, rather
than in traditional intergovernmentalism at the international level. 200
The FSB's work is thus intimately connected to the ongoing work of a
number of key international organizations. Each of them, in turn,
provides a connection between standard setting, regulation, and
states-principally involving, but not limited to, G-20 member states. In
this way, standard setting provides an indirect way for state input
beyond the G-20, encouraging "buy in."20 1 It suggests the
"comitological" 20 2 aspects of the global governance-in which there is an
indirect, though potentially powerful, connection between the sovereign
will of states and the mechanisms through which governance is
effectuated. They are by no means the same, but the echo is clear
enough: the construction of a supranational institutional structure
where harmonization of rules can be developed and then transposed into
the national legal orders of the participating states.
This analysis suggests the strong connection between transnational
private governance and emerging systems of public governance above
the state. Consider the "toolbox" methodologies for standard setting and
enforcement now a significant part of the FSB's governance arsenal. 20 3
To some extent, this approach builds on governance elements now well
established within private transnational governance systems. That
mimicry extends beyond the form of the method-the toolbox itself-to
199. It might also be possible to suggest a similarity to notions underlying the "direct
effects" doctrine of EU law. See Case 26/62, NV Algemene Transporten Expeditie
Onderneming van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963
E.C.R. 1.
200. See Larry CatA Backer, The Extra-National State: American Confederate
Federalism and the European Union, 7 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 173 (2001).
201. On the theory of "buy-in" and its utility within regulatory theory, see, for example,
Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated
Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323 (1998).
202. On comitology within the EU framework, see, for example, Jens Blom-Hansen &
Gijs Jan Brandsma, The EU Comitology System: Intergovernmental Bargaining and
DeliberativeSupranationalism?,47 J. COMMON MARKET STUD. 719 (2009).
203. See text supra Part II.B.
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the intermeshing of that governance approach with related efforts
through other initiatives. 204 In this complex intermeshing, one can
discern the development of consolidated norms within networked
aggregations of privately constituted autonomous groups, negotiating
for a harmonized set of regulatory standards at a supranational level.
At this level, the public law-private law distinction falls away as well. 20 5
Specifically, the intermeshing of regulatory networks of
multinational corporations creates an autonomous governance
framework, which then intermeshes with autonomous networks of
states and vice versa. The model of the state and the multinational
corporation as the basic and default binary foundation of analysis may
no longer be as relevant as it once might have been.206 Just as
multinationals have congregated within networks, so too have states. It
is trhose functionally differentiated networks of states, either formally
or informally constituted, that might best serve the interests of helping
corporate codes reach escape velocity. That result is not a product of
altruism, but instead flows naturally from the value to groups of (the
most powerful) states of a consolidated and autonomous community
with which they can negotiate for more efficient global relationships.
Here, globalization is a crucial factor. The consequence suggests the
construction of polycentric governance frameworks in which the
corporation might owe duties to states in which they operate (and
within the political system of which they assume a subordinate role),
and also simultaneously assume obligations under social norm systems
generated by and generally applicable to the global community of
corporations. We move, then, from a universe that privileges the state to
a governance universe in which actors may acquire obligations and
privileged sources grounded in the social-norm frameworks of nonstate
regulatory communities and legitimated on their own terms.2 07
204. An excellent example of this, perhaps, is the work of the Business Leaders Initiative on
Human Rights (BLIHR). See BUSINESS LEADERS INITIATIVE ON HUMAN RIGHTS,
http://www.blihr.org/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2011). The BLIHR also developed a toolbox fashioned
from a number of principles developed by related governance actors. See CHIP PrrIs & JOHN F.
SHERMAN, BLIHR, HUMAN RIGHTS CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY GUIDE, available at
http/www.blihr.orgLegacy/Downloads/Accountability/20Guide%202008.pdf.
205. "This human rights impact assessment tool is to be used by companies to ensure
that current and future business practices meet human rights standards recommended in
the framework established by the UN Special Representative on business and human

rights." Jim Kelly, Roadmap Announced for Human Rights Global Governance of
24, 2009),
GOVERNANCE
WATCH
(June
Transnational Businesses, GLOBAL
http://www.globalgovernancewatch.org/spotlight-on-sovereignty/roadmap-announced-forhuman-rights-global-governance-of-transnational-businesses.
206. Robe, supra note 122.
207. Li-Wen Lin has recently argued that these private transnational law systems
might well also leak into the law of both host and home states, and as such, ought to be an
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In that context, the FSB structure suggests a restructuring of power
hierarchies. The largest states now unite with the largest private
regulators and assume the highest positions within structures of
regulatory power. Together, they deal with each other from positions of
relative equality. They operate within collaborative structures-from
the great public supranational organizations to the great private
regulatory organizations. They operate through soft and hard law
instruments. A m6lange of statutes, judicial decisions, voluntary codes,
sector standards, and regulatory contracts provide a face to the new
regulatory architecture. The relationship among those instruments, and
the need to order them into something that is at least complementary,
suggests the great object of collaborative regulation at this highest level.
On that basis, for example, the FSB subsumes within it both public and
private regulatory actors. Within the FSB structure, a small state like
El Salvador has more in common with a small economic enterprise, in
terms of regulatory power, than it does with the People's Republic of
China-or Wal-Mart. The FSB suggests the vigor of the "Munich"
principle of international relations, now transposed into law as a source
of legitimacy and power: the notion that third-party states (and now
powerful private regulatory actors) may impose settlements on others,
including those touching on legal regulation. The governance structures
that appear soft and inchoate are becoming harder indeed.
CONCLUSION
Gralf-Peter Calliess is right to note that we have entered "an era
with more, bigger, and increasingly influential transnational
corporations than any time before . . .

,

but also an era when these

corporations' de facto independency from a certain nation-state as their
The growth of the regulatory power of
home base is growing."
nonstate organizations highlights the public/private governance line.
Once understood as segregated objects of laws and put into governance
ghettos whose borders were strictly controlled by the state, nonstate
entities are now assuming governance roles well beyond the
comprehension of theoretical constructs of even a generation ago. The
object is not so much revolutionary as it is complementary and leveling.
object of comparative law study. See Li-Wen Lin, Legal Transplants Through Private
Contracting,57 AM. J. CoMP. L. 711 (2009).
208. Gralf-Peter Calliess, Professor, Univ. of Bremen, Address at the Conference
Kongress Transnationalismus in Recht, Staat und Gesellschaft (Mar. 3, 2010). See GralfPeter Calliess & Jens Mertens, TransnationalCorporations, Global Competition Policy,
and the Shortcomings of Private International Law, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.
(forthcoming July 2011).
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It suggests the reconstitution of governance away from a linear,
hierarchical, monopolistic exercise, in which only one sovereign could
occupy a geographic space at a time. In its place, functionally
differentiated governance systems have emerged, converging within
dynamic governance networks of private and public power. The result is
"the differentiation of global law into transnational legal regimes, which
define the external reach of their jurisdiction along issue-specific rather
than territorial lines, and which claim a global validity for
themselves."209 Corporate constitutionalism suggests that entities can
exist to some extent outside the shadow of the state and can commodify
the products of domestic legal orders. It suggests that the instruments
of such existence need not depend, either with respect to form or
function, on the forms of authoritative public norm making through law.
It also suggests a.framework for polycentric governance for global actors
beyond the state.
Taken together, the organizational and substantive program
institutionalized within the FSB has provided another "glance into the
extremely complex structure of norm creation in the transnational
arena, with important connections to the transformation of the
regulatory landscape of the nation-state"210 and the social norm
governance of private bodies. Still, the evidence, range, and scope of
transnational management of economic activity embodied in the work of
the FSB are both aspirational and at the earliest stages of their
development. Institutionalization and coordination are both young and
uncertain within a G-20 structure in dynamic transition. But more
importantly, the FSB structure suggests the forms through which public
and private governance has begun to converge.
The organization of power will be divided not based on the public or
private character of the organization, but rather on regulatory control of
the enterprise-be it state or corporation. Within these networks of
governance and systems, it is possible to see the outlines of governance
and government in the coming decades. Nonstate actors are
constructing governments without states. States are becoming more
involved in projections of public power through private markets in
which they compete with private actors in functionally differentiated
sectors of activity that no single state controls and they have developed
a taste for privatizing governmental functions.211 Networks of actors
have begun governing using a panoptic model of transparency,
disclosure, and efforts to control the machinery for the production and

209. Fischer-Lescano & Teubner, supra note 123, at 1009.
210. CALLIEss & ZUMBANSEN, supra note 12, at 123-24.
211. See Backer, supranote 64.
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elaboration of values.212 The push toward collective action, the use of
soft law as a vehicle for hard governance through the utilization of the
governance power of surveillance and disclosure, and the incorporation
of regulation through supranational public as well as private organs will
set the tone for government in the coming century. These techniques
and structures, and their framing of substantive governance are ones
equally applicable to private as well as to public regulators. 13 Within
that framework, large aggregations of economic power (usually
operating in corporate form) will have a significant public role to play,
and aggregations of political power (usually organized as states) will
have a significant role as participants in private governance.

212. See Larry Cati Backer, Global Panopticism: States, Corporations, and the
Governance Effects of Monitoring Regimes, 15 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 101 (2008).

213. See, e.g., Thomas McInerney, Putting Regulation Before Responsibility: Towards
Binding Norms of Corporate Social Responsibility, 40 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 171 (2007);
Murphy, supranote 120.

